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The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm
in Canadian Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for
the Provinces and First Nations
Bruce Ryder*
The author explores the possibility of employing Canadian consitutional doctrine to develop
a more flexible approach that would allow for
greater provincial autonomy and First Nation
self-government within the existing scheme of
ss 91 and 92 jurisprudence. Canadian constitutional doctrine is first interpreted through the
competing models of the classical and modem
paradigms. The former emphasizes a sharp
division of powers and has traditionally been
used, the author argues, to invalidate legislation seen to interfere with the market economy.
The modem paradigm, on the other hand, recognizes competing jurisdictions and has been
used to uphold legislation focusing on morals.
The author then brings this analysis to bear on
the issue of provincial autonomy, focusing on
the doctrinal writings of Qurbdcois scholars.
Using the classical paradigm to restrict federal
intrusion, and the modem paradigm to expand
provincial powers will, the author argues,
enhance provincial autonomy within the existing federal structure, pending further constitutional amendment. Finally, the author extends
the analysis to the issue of First Nations autonomy, arguing that similar doctrinal analysis
could be used to promote self-government for
the First Nations.

L'auteur analyse l'interprrtation jurisprudentielle des art. 91 et 92 de la Constitution afin de
determiner si le cadre constitutionnel actuel
peut s'accomoder d'une plus grande autonomie des provinces et des peuples autochtones.
De Ia doctrine constitutionnelle canadienne se
drgagent deux conceptions divergentes de la
distribution des pouvoirs l6gislatifs effecture
par ]a Constitution. La conception classique
congoit les spheres respectives de compdtence
comme distinctes et exclusives; un des motifs
sous-jacents de cette interpretation tendant i
restreindre l'exercice du pouvoir 16gislatif
aurait &6, selon 'auteur, la protection de
l'6conomie de march6. La conception
modeme, par contre, reconnait le chevauchement inevitable des juridictions, et ne le congoit pas comme un mal, 6tant donn6 le but
moral important poursuivi par les 16gislateurs.
L'auteur envisage ensuite la question de l'autonomie provinciale, en se rdftrant Atla doctrine qufbrcoise. I1 conclut qu'invoquer la
conception classique pour restreindre les interventions l6gislatives frddrales tout en 61argissant les pouvoirs l6gislatifs provinciaux h
l'aide de ]a conception modeme permettrait
aux provinces d'acqurrir une plus grande autonomie Ail'int~rieur de la structure constitutionnelle actuelle. Une drmarche semblable accorderait aussi aux peuples autochtones une plus
grande mesure d'auto-drtermination, en attendant, dans un cas comme dans l'autre, d'6ventuels amendements constitutionnels.

*Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I would like to thank Joel
Bakan, Annie Bunting, Joon Min Cho, Richard Cullen, Reuben Hasson, Peter Hogg, Patrick
Macklem, Andrew Petter and Lee Waldorf for their support and comments on an earlier version
of this paper.
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Introduction
In a recent case, Chief Justice Dickson remarked that "[t]he history of
Canadian constitutional law has been to allow for a fair amount of interplay and
indeed overlap between federal and provincial powers."' This is an accurate
description of only part of our constitutional jurisprudence. It may be that, in the
post-World War II era, judicial interpretation of the constitution has gradually
moved away from a "classical" view of the distribution of powers, that allowed
for little overlap and interplay of provincial and federal powers, towards the
more flexible "modem" federalism described by the Chief Justice. But this
movement, from what I will call the classical paradigm to the modem paradigm
in Canadian federalism, has been neither consistent nor steady. Indeed, both
approaches have been invoked by the courts at all stages of our history of constitutional judicial review. Nevertheless, the larger trend does emerge from a
study of the cases. One can say, at least, that the modem paradigm has replaced
the classical paradigm as the dominant approach to the judicial interpretation of
the division of powers.
'O.P.S.E.U. v. A.-G. Ontario, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 at 18, 41 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [hereinafter O.P.S.E.U.
cited to S.C.R.].
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The classical and modern paradigms represent competing judicial
responses to the interpretation of the federal division of powers in sections 91
to 95 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867.' Both seek to give effect to two foundational
principles of the Canadian constitution, namely, responsible government and
federalism. The preamble to the 1867 Act announces that
the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed their
Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to
that of the United Kingdom.

The British constitutional system of responsible government was accordingly
adopted by the federating colonies in Canada. It is a system of representative
democracy in which the head of state acts on the advice of the executive, which
is in turn accountable to a democratically elected legislature. In the United
Kingdom, Parliament has supreme and absolute legislative authority. Any and
all laws are within the competence of Parliament. In Canada, the principle of
parliamentary sovereignty was altered to take account of the desire of the provinces to be "federally united." Thus, sovereign legislative power was divided
between the two levels of government. But it follows from the fusion of parliamentary sovereignty and federalism that the totality of legislative power is distributed between the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures. This
principle, that the distribution of powers is "exhaustive," means that any and all
laws are competent to one level of government or the other. As the Privy Council stated, "whatever belongs to self-government in Canada belongs either to the
Dominion or to the provinces, within the limits of the British North America
Act."3 As all laws must be within the competence of at least one level of government, the people of Canada are entitled to demand that the judicial interpretation of the division of powers not compromise the availability of a full range
of options from the combined competences of their democratically elected legislative bodies.4
2

ConstitutionAct, 1867 (U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (formerly British North America Act, 1867)
[hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867].
3
A.-G. Ontario v. A.-G. Canada(Reference Appeal), [1912] A.C. 71 at 81, 3 D.L.R. 509 (P.C.).
See, generally, P. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 257-58
& 339-40.
4While the distribution of powers in ss 91-95 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is exhaustive, there
are important limitations in other parts of the 1867 Act on the manner in which those powers may
be exercised. For example, the powers of the federal and Quebec governments are limited by the
language rights in s. 133 (see Jones v. A.-G. N.B., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 182, 45 D.L.R. (3d) 583), as
the powers of the Manitoba government are limited by the language rights guaranteed by s. 23 of
the ManitobaAct, 1870, R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 8 (see the Reference re Language Rights under
the ManitobaAct, 1870, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 72, 19 D.L.R. (4th) 1). In addition, the provincial powers
over education cannot be exercised so as to interfere with denominational school rights (s. 93 and
s. 22 of the Manitoba Act, 1870; see Reference re An Act to Amend the EducationAct (Ontario),
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148, 40 D.L.R. (4th) 18), and neither level of government can tax Crown lands
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At the same time, the federal principle embodied in the preamble requires
that provincial and federal governments be coordinate and autonomous within
their respective spheres of competence.5 This principle is reflected in the constitutional division of powers in ss 91-95 that is unalterable by the unilateral
action of either level of government. 6 The provinces' "desire to be federally
united" was a product of their insistence on the preservation of the institutions,
laws and customs of regional majorities.7 The autonomy inherent in a federal
system would prevent national majorities from establishing priorities and policies in areas of jurisdiction allocated to the provincial governments (and viceversa). Hence, the emphasis placed on the notion of "exclusive" spheres of competence in the constitutional division of powers. Reference to "exclusivity" of
(s. 125) or establish inter-provincial tariffs (s. 122). And, of course, the constitutional entrenchment
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter],and of aboriginal
and treaty rights by the enactment of s. 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B of the
CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982], has placed significant
new constraints on the exercise of federal and provincial legislative and executive powers.
Thus, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty has never been absolute in the Canadian constitution, and it is less so since 1982. However, the limitations on government power contained in
the 1867 and 1982 Acts do not alter the fact that the provisions distributing power in ss 91-95 of
the 1867 Act ought to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the principle of exhaustiveness.
Judicial review of legislation in Canada is a two-stage process: the first step is to determine
whether the legislation is within the powers allocated to the enacting government; the second step
is to ensure consistency with the Charterand the other rights guarantees set out in the Constitution
Acts. See, e.g., R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321.
This paper is concerned with the first stage of the constitutional analysis - the interpretation
of the division of powers. The emphasis placed on the relevance of the principle of exhaustiveness
at this stage of the analysis should not obscure the important limitations on legislative power set
out5 elsewhere in the constitutional text.
See Wheare's oft-quoted definition of federalism: "By the federal principle I mean the method
of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere,
co-ordinate and independent." K.C. Wheare, FederalGovernment, 4th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) at 10.
6
There are other provisions of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 that are inconsistent with the classic
federal design of equally autonomous governments. Most notable among these provisions are the
federal government's ability to unilaterally interfere with matters within provincial jurisdiction by
exercising the federal disallowance and declaratory powers (ss 90 and 92(10)(c) respectively). As
a result, the Canadian constitutional text is most accurately described as "quasi-federal." See
Wheare, ibid. at 20. However, Canadian constitutional practice has evolved in the direction of a
true federalism characterized by equal autonomy. Supra. For example, the disallowance and declaratory powers have fallen into disuse, and their exercise by a contemporary federal government
would provoke enormous political consequences. Thus, while my emphasis on the federal nature
of the Canadian constitution fails to capture the ambiguities of the quasi-federal constitutional text,
it is an accurate description of the historical and continuing political forces that shape the living
reality
of the constitution.
7
See, e.g., A.I. Silver, The French-CanadianIdea of Confederation1864-1900 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982); G.P. Browne, ed., Documents on the Confederation of British
North America (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969) at 172-3 (quoting the views of Prime
Minister Tilley of New Brunswick).
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legislative powers appears no less than seven times in ss 91-93, six times in reference to provincial powers. The provincial and federal governments have
mutually exclusive jurisdiction to make laws in relation to the subject matters
assigned to them by the division of powers.
The classical and modern paradigms represent different judicial
approaches to defining "exclusivity" of federal and provincial powers, and thus
of preserving provincial autonomy. The classical paradigm is premised on a
"strong" understanding of exclusivity: there shall be no overlap or interplay
between federal and provincial heads of power. The heads of power in the federal and provincial lists should not be interpreted literally, but should be "mutually modified" in light of the subjects accorded to the jurisdiction of the other
level of government so as to avoid overlapping responsibilities as much as possible. Each level of government must act within its hermetically sealed boxes
of jurisdiction, or "watertight compartments" ("compartiments 6tanches").8 Any
spillover effects on the other level of government's jurisdiction will not be tolerated. Such legislative spillover must be contained, either by ruling such laws
ultra vires, or by "reading them down" so that they remain strictly within the
enacting legislature's jurisdiction. A word that captures the classical approach
to exclusivity has emerged in the francophone constitutional scholarship:
"6tanch6it6." 9
The modem paradigm, on the other hand, is premised on a weaker understanding of exclusivity. Instead of seeking to prohibit as much overlap as possible between provincial and federal powers, the modem approach to exclusivity simply prohibits each level of government from enacting laws whose
dominant characteristic ("pith and substance") is the regulation of a subject matter within the other level of government's jurisdiction. Exclusivity, on this
approach, means the exclusive ability to pass laws that deal predominantly with
a subject matter within the enacting government's catalogue of powers. If a law
is in pith and substance within the enacting legislature's jurisdiction, it will be
upheld notwithstanding that it might have spillover effects on the other level of
government's jurisdiction. And if a problem of national or international dimensions is functionally beyond the capacity of a province to regulate effectively,
8The metaphor is from Lord Atkin's judgment in the Labour Conventions case: "[w]hile the ship
of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters she still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original structure." A.-G. Canada v. A.-G. Ontario
(LabourConventions), [1937] A.C. 326 at 354, 1 D.L.R. 673 (P.C.) [hereinafter Labour Conventions cited to A.C.].
9
See, e.g., P. Patenaude, "L'rosion graduelle de Ta rfgle de l'dtanch6itd: une nouvelle menace
i l'autonomie du Qu6bec" (1979) 20 C. de D. 229; J.-C. Bonenfant, "L'6tanch~it6 de I'A.A.N.B.:
est-elle menac6e?" (1977) 18 C. de D. 383; H. Brun & G. Tremblay, Droit constitutionnel (Montreal: Editions Yvon Blais, 1982) at 340-41. The anglophone scholarship lacks a noun that so concisely captures the classical meaning of exclusivity; the "watertight compartments" metaphor is the
nearest equivalent.
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it will be allocated to federal jurisdiction. In these ways, the modem paradigm,
to borrow Dickson C.J.'s words, allows for a "fair amount of interplay and
indeed overlap between federal and provincial powers."' 0
Both the modem and classical paradigms are legitimate attempts to give
meaning to the fundamental principles that ought to guide the judicial interpretation of the division of powers. Both attempt to preserve federal and provincial
autonomy by giving real meaning to exclusivity, without compromising the
democratic nature of the constitution by denying the principle of the exhaustive
distribution of legislative power. The classical paradigm does so by attempting
to cleanly slice the jurisdictional pie; the modem paradigm divides a cake of
many overlapping layers. However, as I will attempt to demonstrate in this
paper, each on its own imperfectly accomplishes federal and democratic goals.
I will argue that the classical paradigm serves provincial autonomy well in so
far as it limits the ability of the federal government to pass laws intruding on
provincial areas of jurisdiction, but it also unnecessarily limits the scope of provincial jurisdiction and compromises the democratic principle of exhaustiveness. I will argue that the modem paradigm serves the principle of exhaustiveness well by ensuring that all legislation is within the competence of at least one
level of government. But carried to its extreme, the modem paradigm poses a
threat to provincial autonomy.
The weakness of the classical paradigm is that in a complex, interdependent world, social problems do not fit so neatly into jurisdictional boxes. Virtually any piece of legislation can be cut down by a holding of ultra vires if the
classical paradigm is invoked in all its vigour. In addition, the watertight compartments metaphor can give rise to a legislative vacuum by hiving off parts of
interconnected phenomena, granting jurisdiction over part to the federal govemment and part to the provinces. In this way, effective regulation of the whole is
left to the unpredictable fate of attempts at inter-governmental cooperation. In
sum, the classical paradigm is the course of judicial activism, because it puts
more stringent constraints on legislation enacted by both levels of government.
And, by creating legislative vacuums, it compromises the principle of
exhaustiveness.
The modem paradigm is the course of judicial restraint; it avoids the deregulatory tendencies of the classical paradigm by maximizing the ambit of the
legislative powers available to the federal and provincial governments alike.
However, the weakness of the modem paradigm is that it can be employed in
a manner that compromises provincial autonomy. By allowing legislation to
have spillover effects on the other government's areas of jurisdiction, it creates
areas of social life subject to overlapping or concurrent powers. Where overlapI°Supra, note 1.
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ping federal and provincial laws come into conflict, the rule of federal paramountcy provides that the federal law prevails, rendering the provincial law
inoperative to the extent of the conflict. Thus, the modem paradigm, by
extending the areas subject to concurrent powers, extends the potential for federal dominance inherent in the paramountcy rule. Carried to its logical extreme,
the modem paradigm would make a mockery of provincial autonomy.
The above account considers the meaning of the classical and modem paradigms to two levels of government in Canada, the provinces and the federal
government. Missing from the account thus far is the status of a third level of
government that has been recognized in our constitutional history: namely, First
Nations' governments. Neither the ConstitutionAct, 1867 nor the Constitution
Act, 1982 explicitly recognizes the existence of a third level of government.
Nevertheless, the special status of First Nations people and governments are
part of what Slattery has called the "hidden constitution."" The existence of
First Nations was legally recognized in treaties with Britain and France,' 2 and
confrmned by the Royal Proclamationof 1763:
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the
Security of our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom
We are connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be molested or
disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of our Dominions and Territories, as not
having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them,
13
as their Hunting Grounds ...
The Royal Proclamation,which remains in force today, 4 characterized aboriginal title as a valuable interest in land normally acquired by purchase and prohibited private purchases of Indian lands. 5 An exclusive procedure, the treaty

process, was established for all future negotiations between the Crown and First
Nations. Through the treaty process, the Crown recognized its horizontal, nation
"1B. Slattery, "The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada" in M. Boldt & J.A. Long,
eds, The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights (Toronto: University of
Toronto
Press, 1985) 114.
12 For an example of an early treaty with legal effect, see R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, 70
D.L.R. (4th) 427. On the evolution of native rights in the colonial period, see M. Jackson, "The
Articulation of Native Rights in Canadian Law" (1984) 18 U.B.C. L. Rev. 255 at 257-61. In Jackson's words, "[i]t
was through the process of consensual treaty-making, in which Indian tribes were
recognized as independent nations, that the terms of European settlement and the tribes' continued
occupation of their hunting territories were mutually agreed" (supra at 257).
13R.S.C. 1970, App. II, No. I [hereinafter Royal Proclamation].
' 4The legal force of the Royal Proclamationis recognized in s. 25 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
which provides that the Charter shall not be construed in a manner that abrogates or derogates

from any rights pertaining to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including "any rights or freedoms
that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763..."
15See B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 751-54.
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to nation, relationship with the First Nations. 6 As Opekokew has argued,
[t]he Royal Proclamation of 1763, the treaties and other agreements between
Indian governments and the various levels of government in Great Britain and
Canada are no more
7 than formal recognitions of our sovereign aboriginal rights by
the other parties.1

In light of this history, Confederation was a legal non-event as far as the
constitutional status of First Nations people is concerned. They were not consulted or involved in the formulation and adoption of the ConstitutionAct, 1867.

The First Nations "did not consciously decide to enter the country.""8 The only
recognition of the special status of First Nations people in the ConstitutionAct,
1867 is s. 91(24), which allocates exclusive legislative jurisdiction over "Indians and Lands reserved for Indians" to the federal government. From the point
of view of First Nations people, s. 91(24) simply granted to the federal government the exclusive jurisdiction to administer the responsibilities assumed by
Britain in the treaties, and the exclusive jurisdiction to enter into further negotiations and agreements with the First Nations on behalf of the Crown. 9 The
inherent sovereignty of First Nations was never surrendered, nor could it be
without the "full and free consent of the Indians. ' '2' Thus, the British principle
of parliamentary sovereignty has to be further adapted to the Canadian constitutional context by taking into account not only the existence of a federal division of powers between the provinces and the federal government and of
entrenched constitutional rights,2' but also the existence of the unsurrendered
inherent sovereignty of the First Nations.
However, both prior to and following Confederation non-native governments have viewed First Nations people as subjects of the Crown rather than as
members of independent nations in their own right. Relying on the theory of
parliamentary supremacy, and its corollary, the principle of exhaustive distribu-

16 W. Many Fingers, "Commentary: Aboriginal Peoples and the Constitution" (1981) 19 Alta. L.

Rev.7 428.
1 D. Opekokew, The FirstNations:Indian Government in the Community of Man (Regina: Federation
of Saskatchewan Indians, 1982) at 23.
8
1 Many Fingers, supra, note 16 at 429.
19 D. Opekokew, The FirstNations: Indian Government and the CanadianConfederation (Saskatoon: Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, 1980) 46; Opekokew, supra, note 17 at 19-20;
F. Plain, "A Treatise on the Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of the Continent of North America,"
in Boldt & Long, eds, supra, note 11, 31 at 34 (s. 91(24) "was enacted to make clear the power
of the federal government to engage in colonial expansion in the west"); C. Chartier, "Aboriginal
Rights and Land Issues: The Metis Perspective," in Boldt & Long, eds, supra, 54 at 56 ("the aboriginal peoples maintain that section 91(24) indicates only that the federal government has jurisdiction to enter into relationships and discussions with aboriginal nations"); Many Fingers, supra,
note 16 at 428 ("Section 91(24) was a grant from Britain to Canada to administer responsibilities
that Britain had assumed by its treaties.").
20
Opekokew, supra, note 17 at 19.
21
Supra, note 4.
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tion of legislative power in a federal constitution, s. 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867 has been interpreted by the federal government as conferring upon it
plenary legislative authority over "Indians and lands reserved for Indians."
Beginning with the 1869 Act for the GradualEnfranchisementof Indians22 and
the Indian Act, 1876,' the Dominion government sought to interfere with and
ultimately replace First Nations' governments by defining and imposing the
band council system. "Federal control of on-reserve governmental systems
became the essence of Canadian-Indian constitutional relations."24 On the few
occasions on which the Supreme Court of Canada has considered the scope of
federal power under s. 91(24), it has assumed that the section confers plenary
authority on the federal government to pass laws dealing with "Indians and
Lands reserved for Indians."' The federal government and the judiciary have
thus rejected the First Nations' view of s. 91(24), which would allow for the
assertion of federal jurisdiction to pass laws affecting their people only with the
consent of First Nations people themselves.26
The federal government has insisted that Indian government must fit into the existing division of powers between the provinces and the federal government - that
is, that Indian government must be subordinate to the jurisdictional authority of
the provinces and the federal government. Under such constraints the autonomy
of Indian government would be severely limited.27

Just as Quebec did not consent to the adoption of the Constitution Act,
1982, the First Nations did not consent to the adoption of the ConstitutionAct,
1867 and its failure to explicitly acknowledge the reality of First Nations' govenments. First Nations people have long demanded new constitutional arrangements that recognize First Nations governments as "full and equal partners in
Canada's constitution."' Some progress was made with the adoption of section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which provides that "[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized
and affirmed." For First Nations people, the concept of "aboriginal rights"
entails their unsurrendered, original sovereignty as independent nations.29 On
22S.C. 1869,

c. 6.
23S.C. 1876, c. 18.
24
JS. Milloy, "The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strategy and Constitutional Change," in
I.A.L. Getty & A.S. Lussier, eds, As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983) 56 at 62.
25See, e.g., Canada(A.-G.) v. Giroux, (1916) 53 S.C.R. 172, 30 D.L.R. 123; Re Eskimos, [1939]
S.C.R.
104, 2 D.L.R. 417.
26
Many Fingers, supra, note 16 at 432; P. Macklem, "First Nations Self-Government and the
Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 382.
27
L. Little Bear, J.A. Long & M. Boldt, eds, Pathwaysto Self-Determination:CanadianIndians

and
the CanadianState (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984) at 174-75.
28
Opekokew, supra, note 19 at 46.
29

See T. Berger, Northern Frontier,Northern Homeland: The Report of the Mackenzie Valley
Pipeline Inquiry, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1977); Minutes of Proceedingsof
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this view, s. 35(1) could be interpreted as an affirmation of the horizontal relationship existing between the Crown and First Nations. However, in its first

judgment interpreting s. 35, R. v. Sparrow," the Supreme Court indicated that
it continues to view the constitution as exhaustively distributing legislative
power between the two constitutional levels of non-native government. The
Court did not question the assertion of sovereignty over the First Nations by the
British Crown:
It is worth recalling that while British policy towards the native population
was based on respect for their right to occupy their traditional lands, a proposition
to which the Royal Proclamation of 1763 bears witness, there was from the outset
power, and indeed the underlying
never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative
31
title, to such lands vested in the Crown.
Section 35(1) changes the constitutional situation by protecting existing aboriginal and treaty rights. This protection gives the First Nations "a measure of control over government conduct and a strong check on legislative power" 32 exercised by federal or provincial governments; however, it is not a recognition of
the legislative jurisdiction of First Nations' governments. Rather than envisioning a federal relationship between coordinate and autonomous governments, the Supreme Court "is not willing to move away from a hierarchical
vision of the relationship between the First Nations and the Canadian state in
the realm of constitutional jurisprudence. 3 3 According to the Court in Sparrow:
the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect

to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government and aboriginals
is trust-like ...34
we find that the words "recognition and affirmation" incorporate the fiduciary
relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint on the exercise of sovereign power. Rights that are recognized and affrmned are not absolute. Federal
legislative powers continue, including, of course, the right to legislate with respect
to Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) of the ConstitutionAct, 1867. These powers must,
however, be read together with s. 35(1). In other words, federal power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to
demand the justification35 of any government regulation that infringes upon or
denies aboriginal rights.
the Special Committee on Indian Self-Government (The Penner Committee Report) (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1983); M. Asch, Home and Native Land: Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian
Constitution (Toronto: Methuen, 1984) at 27; Many Fingers, supra, note 16; Opekokew, supra,
note 17; Opekokew, supra, note 19.
3[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Sparrow cited to S.C.R.].
31
Ibid. at 1103.
32
1bid. at 1110.
33
Macklem, supra, note 26 at 450.
34Supra, note 30 at 1108.
35
1bid. at 1109.
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Thus, while s. 35(1) is an important advance in providing some constitutional protection to previously vulnerable aboriginal and treaty rights, it is abundantly clear that a new constitutional arrangement is required to place aboriginal
self-government on a secure footing.
Until such a constitutional amendment is achieved, the distinct constitutional history of the First Nations ought to provide the interpretive lens through
which the courts and the federal government approach s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In Macklem's words,
The judiciary must begin to construct principles that accept the fact that native
people did not surrender their sovereignty or pre-existing forms of government by
the mere fact of European settlement. The law governing the distribution of legislative authority over native people ought to eliminate the interpretive obstacles
currently in place that permit extensive federal regulation of native people absent
native consent, and construct principles governing the distribution of authority to
allow for the ability of native
36 people themselves to pass laws governing their individual and collective lives.
Rather than envisioning a hierarchical relationship between the First Nations
and non-native governments - a vision founded in part on ethnocentric attitudes that view native cultural differences as giving rise to a need for "protection" and "assimilation" - the courts should adopt an autonomist approach to
the interpretation of federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24). An autonomist conception of the distinct constitutional status of First Nations people would recognize

that the creation of an equality of differences between the founding and original
cultural groups requires that political spaces be accorded to those groups in

which they can define their difference themselves.
The protection of provincial autonomy has been a value of primary impor-

tance in Canadian constitutional discourse,37 resulting from an understanding
36

Supra, note 26 at 418.
For some of the classic judicial statements emphasizing that provincial autonomy is a foundational principle of the Canadian constitution, see Hodge v. R., (1883) 9 App. Cas. 117 at 132 (P.C.)
37

[hereinafter Hodge]; A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Ont. (Local Prohibition), [1896] A.C. 348, 5 Cart. 295
(P.C.) [hereinafter Local Prohibitioncited to A.C.]; Liquidatorsof the Maritime Bank v. Receiver

GeneralofNew Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437 at 441-43, 5 Cart. 1 (P.C.) (the object of the 1867 Act
was "neither to weld the provinces into one, nor to subordinate provincial governments to a central
authority, but to create a federal government in which they should all be represented, entrusted with
the exclusive administration of affairs in which they had a common interest, each province retaining its independence and autonomy"); Montreal (City) v. Montreal Street Railway, (1910) 43

S.C.R. 197 at 232, 11 C.R.C. 203, aff'd [1912] A.C. 333, 1 D.L.R. 681 ("Division of legislative
authority is the principle of the 'British North America Act,' and if the doctrine of necessarily incidental powers is to be extended to all cases in which inconvenience arises from such a division
that is the end of the federal character of the Union."); In re the Initiative and Referendum Act,

[1919] A.C. 935 at 942, 48 D.L.R. 18 (P.C.); Edwards v. A.-G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 at 136,
1 D.L.R. 98 (P.C.) (the 1867 Act should be given "a broad and liberal interpretation, so that the
Dominion to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, may be mistress in her own house, as
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that the federal principle was adopted in Canada as a means of protecting cul-

tural and institutional differences associated with regionally-based majorities.

s

the provinces, to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, are mistresses in theirs"); Lawson
v. InteriorTree Fruitand Vegetable Committee, [1931] S.C.R. 357 at 366, 2 D.L.R. 193; In re the
Regulation and Control of Aeronautics, [1932] A.C. 54 at 70, 1 D.L.R. 58 (P.C.) (the preservation
of the rights of minorities was "the foundation upon which the whole structure" of Canadian federalism was built; the "process of interpretation as the years go on ought not to be allowed to dim
or to whittle down the provisions of the original contract upon which the federation was founded");
Labour Conventions, supra, note 8 at 352.
Provincial autonomy remains a central concern in the modem jurisprudence, particularly in the
cases dealing with the scope of federal jurisdiction to pass laws dealing with the "general regulation of trade" (s. 91(2)) or matters of a national dimension (p.o.g.g.). See, especially, Reference re
Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452 [hereinafter Anti-Inflation Reference
cited to S.C.R.]; R. v. Crown Zellerbach CanadaLtd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 161
[hereinafter Crown Zellerbach cited to S.C.R.]; GeneralMotors of CanadaLtd. v. City National
Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 255 [hereinafter GeneralMotors cited to S.C.R.],
discussed briefly at infra, notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
38While Canadian constitutional scholars agree that provincial autonomy as a means of respecting cultural diversity is an important constitutional value, not all would agree that it is a value
deserving the interpretive weight accorded it in this paper and in the judgments cited supra, note
37. Ultimately, Canadians agree that the federal constitution demands that autonomy be accorded
to the federal and provincial governments, but they disagree endlessly and vociferously on the
appropriate scope of and balance between those respective autonomies. For example, there is a
strong tradition in the francophone scholarship of emphasizing the value of provincial autonomy
(see Part Ill, below); there is an equally strong tradition in the anglophone scholarship of advocating an increase in the powers of the federal government. See, e.g., F.R. Scott, Essays on the Constitution: Aspects of CanadianLaw and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977); the
overview of Bora Laskin's centralist vision in K.E. Swinton, The Supreme Court and Canadian
Federalism:The Laskin-Dickson Years (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 219-57; and the summary of
the views of other anglophone scholars in A.C. Cairns, "The Judicial Committee and Its Critics"
(1971) 4 Can. J.Poli. Sci. 301 and J.C. Bakan, "Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and
Legitimacy in Canadian Constitutional Thought" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. 123 at 130ff. For
centralists like Laskin and Scott, a strong central government was necessary for effective and equitable social and economic regulation and for the protection of civil liberties: "provincial autonomy
means national inactivity," and "the more we have of the one, the more we have of the other" (B.
Laskin, "Reflections on the Canadian Constitution After the First Century" (1967) 45 Can. Bar
Rev. 395 at 400).
The text, history and structure of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 are too ambiguous to provide guidance on the appropriate weight to be placed on the value of federal or provincial autonomy respectively. "The inference from the structure will be essentially the importance of preserving two autonomous levels of government over time, rather than the appropriate place at which to draw the lines
between federal and provincial responsibilities" (Swinton, supra, at 201-202). This has led some
authors to conclude that the choice is largely "a matter of a priori belief rather than rational argument" (P.J. Monahan, "At Doctrine's Twilight: The Structure of Canadian Federalism" (1984) 34
U.T.L.J. 47 at 87); see also R. Simeon, "Criteria for Choice in Federal Systems" (1982-83) 8
Queen's L.J. 131 at 140.
I share the view of those who believe that Canada is a strongly federal society from a sociological point of view, and that provincial autonomy must be treated as a constitutional value of
supreme importance in order to respect the basic reality of cultural diversity in the country, particularly the concentration of French Canadians in Quebec. This view underlies the writings of the
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The First Nations have a similar claim to autonomy as a means of protecting
their distinctive cultural and political traditions, a claim that has been relegated
to a marginal position in Canadian constitutional interpretation. An understanding of the central place in Canadian constitutional discourse of the federal principle to the preservation of cultural difference, together with an acknowledgement of the fact that First Nations people never consented to the assertion of
sovereignty over all elements of their lives by non-native governments constituted by the Constitution Act, 1867, provide the foundations for an autonomist
approach to s. 91(24).
Until further constitutional reform is accomplished by amendment, a measure of autonomy can be accorded to First Nations governments by using standard interpretive techniques within the existing structure of Canadian federalism.
Such an autonomist approach to s. 91(24) would draw inspiration from an
understanding that the federal principle is the manner favoured by the Canadian
constitution for the preservation of territorially-based cultural difference. The
federal principle requires that each level of government be coordinate, equal and
autonomous within their respective spheres of jurisdiction. On this approach, s.
91(24) imposes on the federal government an obligation to ensure the autonomy
of First Nations governments. The federal government cannot pass laws dealing
with "Indians and Lands reserved for Indians" absent the consent of the First
Nations affected." In addition, autonomy for First Nations people requires some
protection from the application of provincial laws. Here is where the classical
paradigm has a crucial role to play in an autonomist interpretation of s. 91(24).
The classical paradigm could prevent provincial laws from applying on
reserves, and could prevent provincial laws from applying to matters that touch
the heart of the individual and collective identities of First Nations people on
or off reserves. In addition, a classical approach to paramountcy would prevent
any provincial laws from applying in areas where federal First Nations law is
in force. And finally, a classical approach to inter-delegation would prevent the
federal government from delegating the power to enact laws dealing with "Indians" or "Indian lands" to the provinces without the consent of First Nations people. As we shall see, the modem paradigm has been favoured by the courts in
the interpretation of s. 91(24), so that in many respects First Nations people are
subject to the concurrent application of federal and provincial laws. In this context, the modem paradigm represents an unacceptable paternalistic relationship
between the federal government and First Nations people; it is fundamentally at
odds with an autonomist interpretation of s. 91(24).
Qu6becois scholars discussed in Part III, below; see also D.M. Cameron, "Whither Canadian Federalism? The Challenge of Regional Diversity and Maturity," in J.P. Meekison, ed., CanadianFederalism: Myth or Reality? 3d ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1977) 304.
391 am relying here on the argument of Macklem, supra, note 26.
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The goal of this paper is to use the understandings of the strengths and
weaknesses of the modem and classical paradigms outlined above to evaluate
the degree to which the pattern of Canadian constitutional interpretation has furthered democratic principles and has promoted autonomy for the provinces and
First Nations. While each paradigm has a legitimate and valuable role to play
in furthering democracy and a meaningful federalism for the three levels of government, I will argue that the classical and modem paradigms have each been
employed in a manner that does not further these foundational principles of the
Canadian constitution. The occasions on which the classical paradigm has been
invoked provide a road map of the deregulatory impulses of the Canadian judiciary, while the occasions on which the modem paradigm has been invoked
chart those areas where the judiciary has been tolerant of regulation in the name
of social order, morality or paternalism. One hardly need point out that the
Canadian constitution enshrines no particular economic or social theory. 0 It is
our elected representatives, rather than the judiciary, who ought to determine the
appropriate scope and form of state regulation. I will attempt to show in this
paper how the doctrinal structure of Canadian constitutional interpretation can
be lifted from market and moral biases, and put to the service of democratic and
federal principles. In doing so, I will attempt to engage with the "three solitudes" of Canadian constitutional thought, namely the differing perspectives of
Qu6b6cois, First Nation and anglophone (non-native) scholars.4
In Part I, I will set out in more detail the distinct doctrinal features of the
classical and modem paradigms that flow from their competing understandings
of the meaning of exclusivity. In Part II, I will undertake a brief historical overview of the application of the classical and modem paradigms, concluding with
an examination of a prominent recent example of the application of the classical
paradigm, the Supreme Court decision in Commission de la Santg et Securitidu
Travail v. Bell Canada.42 I will attempt to show in Part II how the deregulatory
bias of the classical paradigm has been applied to legislative attempts to regulate market relations, while the tolerance of the modem paradigm has been
applied to legislation perceived to deal with questions of morality and social
order. In Part III, I will consider the relationship of the classical paradigm to
40

See Holmes J.'s remark regarding the U.S. Constitution, dissenting in Lochner v. New York,

198 U.S. 45 (1905) at 75.
41I do not mean to suggest that views are uniform within these three groupings of thought regard-

ing Canadian federalism. But different basic assumptions and cultural attitudes tend to inform
scholarship in these three traditions. I say "three solitudes" because neither Qu6bdcois people nor
members of the First Nations believe that they are full and equal partners in current Canadian constitutional arrangements, and because there has been very little successful dialogue across the cultural and linguistic divides. The anglophone scholarship, in particular, too frequently has failed to

engage with the contributions of Qu~bcois and First Nation scholars. On the other hand, Qu6b6cois and First Nation scholars have had little choice but to engage with and challenge the dominant

vision of anglophone scholars.
421[1988] 1 S.C.R. 749, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 161 [hereinafter Bell 1988 cited to S.C.R.].
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provincial autonomy. I will argue that provincial autonomy and democratic values are best protected by applying the classical paradigm to limit the scope of
federal jurisdiction, and by applying the elements of the modem paradigm to the
scope of provincial jurisdiction, the paramountcy doctrine, and inter-delegation.
While the claims of provincial autonomy have been a central concern of Canadian constitutional jurisprudence, the equally valid claims of First Nations people to autonomy have been ignored by the doctrinal structure of Canadian federalism. In Part IV, I will demonstrate that the modem paradigm has been
applied to First Nations people; that is, they are subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and provincial laws even when those laws touch matters at the
heart of their collective identities. I will argue that the classical paradigm should
be used to promote the autonomy of First Nations people by protecting them
from the application of provincial laws, by giving a broad scope to the doctrine
of federal paramountcy, and by prohibiting delegation of federal jurisdiction
over "Indians and lands reserved for Indians" to the provinces without the consent of First Nations people.
I.

Doctrinal Features of the Classical and Modern Paradigms

A.

4"
The ClassicalParadigm

The doctrinal metaphor which most accurately captures the understanding
of exclusivity animating the classical paradigm is the idea that the powers conferred by ss 91 and 92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 constitute "watertight compartments."' The exercise of legislative power by Parliament or the provincial
legislatures must be confined to discrete boxes, or "watertight compartments"
of jurisdiction, without any spillover effects on matters falling within the classes
of subjects allocated exclusively to the legislative jurisdiction of the other level
of government. The judicial task is to find, in the text or precedent, the clearly
demarcated boundaries of the mutually exclusive spheres of activity of both levels of government.
The classical paradigm entails a very narrow conception of the degree to
which the "pith and substance" doctrine allows legislation to have "incidental
43For other descriptions of the classical paradigm in federalism law, see J.A. Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism," in A.R.M. Lower et al, eds, Evolving CanadianFederalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1958) 92 at 95-96; P. Macklem, "Constitutional Ideologies" (1988)
20 Ottawa L. Rev. 117 at 129-33; J.R. Mallory, "The Five Faces of Federalism," in P.-A. Crdpeau
& C.B. Macpherson, eds, The Futureof CanadianFederalismlL'avenirdufdralisme canadien
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) 3 at 5-7; Monahan, supra, note 38 at 51-57; P. Monahan, "The Supreme Court and the Economy," in I. Bemier & A. Lajoie, eds, The Supreme Court
of Canadaas an Instrument of PoliticalChange (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) 105
at 144-49; K. Swinton, supra, note 38 at 259-91 (Chapter 9, "Beetz's Classical Federalism").
44Supra, note 8.
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effects" on the other level of government's jurisdiction. Iflegislation does spill
over the constitutional watertight compartments, even if its dominant characteristic ("pith and substance") is a matter within the enacting government's jurisdiction, and even if the spillage is incidental to the accomplishment of the otherwise valid legislative scheme, the legislation will be held to be ultra vires the
enacting legislature unless the incidental effects are absolutely necessary to the
achievement of the valid legislative objective. A less drastic, alternative remedy
is to uphold the validity of the legislation but limit its application by "reading
it down" so as to prevent the legislation from applying in areas outside of the
enacting legislature's "compartments" of jurisdiction. In this way, the inevitable
"spillage" can be contained. This technique is known as the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine: laws must be read down to preserve the immunity (or exclusivity) of the other level of government's areas of jurisdiction. 4"
Thus, the classical paradigm represents an attempt to confine the exercise
of legislative power to mutually exclusive and self-contained boxes of jurisdiction. This approach by definition allows no room for overlap and interplay of
federal and provincial laws. Thus, the double aspect doctrine, articulated by the
Privy Council in Hodge, has always been the bte noire of the classical
approach. According to that doctrine, "subjects which in one aspect and for one
purpose fall within s. 92, may in another aspect and for another purpose fall
within s. 91. "46 In other words, some laws will be competent to both levels of
government, and some areas of social life will be subject to concurrent federal
and provincial power. For the judge who favours the classical approach, like
Lord Haldane, Chief Justice Duff or Justice Beetz, these notions are unattractive. For them, it is a theory that "ought to be applied only with great caution."'47
Overlap and consequent concurrency of powers are antithetical to the theory of
mutual exclusivity that animates the classical paradigm.
It also follows from the basic tenets of the classical approach that the doctrine of paramountcy should be given a broad scope. If the classical paradigm
operated perfectly, there would be no overlapping laws and thus no need for a
rule of paramountcy. But the classical paradigm expresses an ideal, not a reality.
When the watertight compartments ideal falters, federal paramountcy provides
45

0n the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, see Hogg, supra, note 3 at 329-32; D. Gibson,

"Interjurisdictional Immunity in Canadian Federalism" (1969) 47 Can. Bar Rev. 40; R. Elliott,
"Constitutional Law - Division of Powers - Interjurisdictional Immunity, Reading Down and
Pith and Substance: Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Attorney Generalfor Ontario"
67 Can. Bar. Rev. 523.
(1988)
46

Supra, note 37 at 130.

47

See Lord Haldane in A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Alta (Insurance), [1916] 1 A.C. 588 at 596, 26 D.L.R.

288 (P.C.) [hereinafter Insurance Reference cited to A.C.], Duff C.J. in ProvincialSecretary of
P.E.L v. Egan, [1941] S.C.R. 396, 3 D.L.R. 305 at 309, and Beetz J. in Bell 1988, supra, note 42
at 706.
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a simple means of sweeping away any overlapping provincial legislation and
thus restoring the classical ideal.
On the classical interpretation, federal paramountcy means that wherever
there is overlap or duplication of federal and provincial laws - wherever federal legislation has "covered the field" - the federal law will render the provincial law inoperative. A related classical conception of paramountcy is the "negative implication" test. On this test, the courts read into federal legislation an
unspoken implication that any overlapping provincial legislation is to be suspended. In other words,
a federal law may be read as including not only its express provisions, but also a
"negative implication" that those express provisions should not be supplemented
s
or duplicated by any provincial law on the same subject

The classical understanding of exclusivity would prohibit the delegation of

legislative powers from one level of government to the other. To permit such
inter-delegation of power would be to allow for the creation of temporary areas
of concurrent jurisdiction in violation of the principle of exclusivity. Rinfret C.J.
expressed the classical approach to inter-delegation as follows:
Neither legislative bodies, federal or provincial, possess any portion of the
powers respectively vested in the other and they cannot receive it by delegation.
In that connection the word "exclusively" used in both section 91 and in section
92 indicates a settled line of demarcation and it does not belong
to either Parlia49
ment, or the Legislatures, to confer powers upon the other.

B.

50
The Modern Paradigm

The modem paradigm is based on a weaker understanding of exclusivity
than the watertight compartments approach animating the classical paradigm.
48Hogg, supra, note 3 at 359.
49
A.G. Nova Scotia v. A.G. Canada (Nova Scotia Inter-delegation), [1951] S.C.R. 31 at 34-35,
[1950] 4 D.L.R. 369 [hereinafter Nova Scotia Inter-delegation cited to S.C.R.].
5°1n describing the modem paradigm, I have relied heavily on Patrick Monahan's similar account
in his excellent article, supra, note 38 at 64-69. While few authors have named a "modem paradigm" in Canadian federalism, I consider Dickson C.J. to be its chief judicial proponent and Peter
Hogg to be its chief academic proponent. For a summary of Dickson C.J.'s approach to the division
of powers, see Swinton, supra, note 38 at 293-317. As she puts it,
[t]he way of concurrency of legislative powers, just as the adoption of a narrow definition of conflict between federal and provincial laws for purposes of paramountcy
doctrine, is the way of judicial restraint, and Dickson was quite content to travel that
road, leaving the resolution of problems arising from overlap and interaction of jurisdiction to the political forum" (ibid. at 314).
Hogg's leading textbook on Canadian constitutional law (supra, note 3) is a thorough articulation
and defence of the modem understanding of exclusivity in the name of judicial restraint (supra at
99) and provincial autonomy (supraat 364). For example, he advocates the liberal use of the pith
and substance doctrine, allowing substantial impact on matters outside of the enacting level of
government's jurisdiction (supra at 313-15); he critiques the prohibition on legislative interdelegation of powers (supra at 295-308); he defends a restrained role for paramountcy (supra at
355-65); and he critiques the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine (supra at 328-32).
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The belief in clear boundaries separating the legitimate spheres of provincial
and federal activity is abandoned in favour of a recognition of interdependence
and overlap in federal and provincial spheres of activity.
Exclusivity, on the modem approach, means the exclusive ability to pass
laws that deal predominantly with a subject matter allocated to the enacting
government's jurisdiction. The pith and substance doctrine is applied liberally;
in other words, so long as the dominant or most important characteristic of a law
falls within a class of subjects allocated to the jurisdiction of the enacting government, the law will be held to be intra vires, even if there is spillover, or incidental effects, in areas outside of its jurisdiction."
As the modem paradigm by definition allows for a wide scope of overlap
and interplay between provincial and federal laws, the double aspect doctrine is
embraced enthusiastically by its judicial proponents. As a result, areas of social
life become increasingly subject to concurrent federal and provincial power.
The interjurisdictional immunity doctrine has no place in the modem paradigm, for it conflicts with the liberal approach to the pith and substance doctrine. Spillover is not to be contained, but is inevitable and indeed welcomed
under the modem paradigm.52
Similarly, the doctrine of paramountcy is given a narrower scope. The
"covering the field" and "negative implication" approaches to paramountcy are
rejected.53 Overlap and duplication of laws does not give rise to federal paramountcy. Quoting Lederman and Hogg, Dickson J.stated in Multiple Access
Ltd. v. McCutcheon 4 that
duplication is ... "the ultimate in harmony." The resulting "untidiness" or "diseconomy" of duplication is the price we pay for a federal system in which economy
"often has to be subordinated to [...]
provincial autonomy" ... Mere duplication
of
without actual conflict or contradiction is not sufficient to invoke the doctrine
55
paramountcy and render otherwise valid provincial legislation inoperative.

The paramountcy doctrine is only invoked when absolutely necessary; that is,

when there is an express conflict between federal and provincial laws in the
sense that compliance with both laws is impossible."
51

See Hogg, ibid. at 313-5; W. Lederman, "The Concurrent Operation of Federal and Provincial
Laws in Canada" (1963) 9 McGill L.J. 185; W. Lederman, "The Balanced Interpretation of the
Federal Distribution of Legislative Powers in Canada," in Continuing Canadian Constitutional
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) 266.
Dilemnas
52
Hogg, supra, note 3 at 328-32.
53
1bid. at 355-65.
-4[1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, 138 D.L.R. (3d) 1 [hereinafter Multiple Access cited to S.C.R.].
55
1bid. at 190, quoting Lederman, "The Concurrent Operation of Federal and Provincial Laws
in Canada," supra, note 51 at 195, and P. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada(Toronto: Carswell,
1977)
at 110, now supra, note 3 at 364.
56
See Lederman, ibid. at 191 ("In principle, there would seem to be no good reasons to speak
of paramountcy and preclusion except where there is actual conflict in operation as where one
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The modem understanding of exclusivity would not prohibit federal interdelegation of power. Rather, the modem judge would welcome the constitutional flexibility inherent in inter-delegation, and would not be concerned about
its temporary creation of areas of concurrent jurisdiction. While the Supreme
Court has continued to pay lip-service to the classical prohibition on legislative
inter-delegation, 7 it has moved progressively closer to the modem position by
sanctioning the use of devices such as administrative inter-delegation"9 and

anticipatory incorporation by reference.

9

As Hogg has noted, the cases "have

reinstated federal inter-delegation as an important tool of cooperative federalism," permitting Canadian legislatures to "do indirectly what they cannot do
directly."' Although the Court has not clearly articulated the rationale for permitting federal inter-delegation in these forms, it seems likely that they flow
from a desire to avoid the rigidity of the classical approach to exclusivity. 61
The classical paradigm can be summed up as follows: every social problem
should be capable of being addressed by only one level of government, and then
only if the social problem fits neatly inside that government's jurisdictional
compartments. The modem paradigm can be summed up as follows: every
social problem ought to be capable of being addressed by at least one level of

government, but preferably both. The attempt to demarcate bright line spheres
of exclusive powers gives way to an acceptance of a great deal of overlap and
interplay of exclusive powers.

enactment says 'yes' and the other says 'no;' 'the same citizens are being told to do inconsistent
things;' compliance with one is defiance of the other.")
57
The decision in the Nova Scotia Inter-delegationcase, supra, note 49, has not been overruled.
58
P.E.L PotatoMarketing Boardv. Willis, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392, 4 D.L.R. 146 [hereinafter Willis
cited to S.C.R.]; Coughlin v. OntarioHighway TransportBoard, [1968] S.C.R. 569, 68 D.L.R. (2d)
384 [hereinafter Coughlin cited to S.C.R.]; Reference re AgriculturalProducts Marketing Act,
[1978]
2 S.C.R. 1198, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 257.
59
A.-G. Ont. v. Scott, [1956] S.C.R. 137, 1 D.L.R. (2d) 433 [hereinafter Scott]; Lord's Day Alliance of Canadav. A.-G. B.C., [1959] S.C.R. 497, 19 D.L.R. (2d) 97; Coughlin, ibid.; Dick v. R.,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 309, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 33 [hereinafter Dick cited to S.C.R.].
60
Hogg, supra, note 3 at 307.
6'In several uncharacteristically frank dicta, the judges have indicated that they favour the
flexibility inherent in cooperative federal inter-delegation. For example, after upholding the administrative inter-delegation at issue in Coughlin, Cartwright J. stated that "it is satisfactory to find that
there is nothing which compels us to hold that the object sought by this co-operative effort is constitutionally unattainable" (supra,note 58 at 576). Similarly, in Reference re AgriculturalProducts
Marketing Act, Pigeon J. described the cooperative scheme of administrative inter-delegation as
perfectly legitimate, otherwise it would mean that our Constitution makes it impossible
by federal-provincial cooperative action to arrive at any practical scheme for the
orderly and efficient production and marketing of a commodity which all governments
concerned agree requires regulation in both intraprovincial and extraprovincial trade.
...when after 40 years a sincere cooperative effort has been accomplished, it would
really be unfortunate if this was all brought to nought (supra, note 58 at 1296).
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The Historical Application of the Two Paradigms

The elements of both the modem and classical paradigms have been
invoked as judicial responses to defining the exclusivity of the division of powers since the early days following Confederation. Indeed, the pattern in which
they continue to be used was established early on in a series of cases dealing
with the liquor trade and the insurance industry respectively. It was largely these
two trades that provided the stage on which competitive attempts by federal and
provincial governments to regulate trade played out in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century.
Regulation of the insurance industry was necessary to give the public
greater security and confidence in the industry, because of the especially vulnerable position of the consumer of insurance:
Because the terms and conditions of insurance policies are in practice stipulated by the insurer, and are not well understood by the insured, governments
sought to protect the insured by requiring the inclusion of certain conditions in

every policy. Because the financial strength, probity and permanence of an insurer
cannot in practice be judged by the insured, and are essential to the fulfilment of
the policy, governments sought to control entry to, and supervise the performance
of, the industry by licensing insurers, by requiring a security deposit, by limiting
62
the insurers' powers of investment, and by official inspection of their books.

Insurance regulation was, thus, an early form of consumer protection legislation

designed to counter the potential for abuse of market power by insurance companies. 61
Regulation of the liquor trade also sprung from a desire to protect the consumers of liquor and their dependents. The movement demanding regulation of

the liquor trade had a strong moral and religious flavour. The movement was
headed by church groups and early women's organizations, such as the

Women's Christian Temperance Union. These groups believed that the consumption of alcohol was a threat to the moral and domestic order, and thus an
evil that had to be eradicated by prohibitive legislation.'
62
Hogg,
63

supra, note 3 at 457.
For overviews of the history of regulation of the insurance industry, see C.D. Baggaley, The
Emergence of the Regulatory State in Canada,1867-1939 (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada,
1981) at 232-42; Hogg, supra, note 3 at 457-60; C. Armstrong, "Federalism and Government Regulation: the Case of the Canadian Insurance Industry, 1927-34" (1976) 19 Can. Pub. Admin. 88.
64On the history of prohibition legislation, see J. Schull, OntarioSince 1867 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978) at 88-94; R.E. Spence, Prohibitionin Canada(Toronto: Ontario Branch
of the Dominion Alliance, 1919); J.F. Davison, "The Problem of Liquor Legislation in Canada"
(1926) 4 Can. Bar Rev. 468; G. Decarie, "Something Old, Something New...: Aspects of Prohibitionism in Ontario in the 1890's" in D. Swainson, ed., Oliver Mowat's Ontario (Toronto: Macmillan, 1972) 156; G.A. Hallowell, Prohibitionin Ontario,1919-23 (Ottawa: Love Printing Service,
1972); A.H.F. Lefroy, "Prohibition: The Late Privy Council Decisions" (1896) 16 Can. L. Times
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In its early decisions, the Privy Council held that the regulation of the liquor trade was a double aspect matter; it upheld prohibition legislation passed at
the provincial and federal level.' The regulation of the insurance industry, on
the other hand, was within the exclusive competence of the provincial governments; federal attempts to regulate the trade were consistently ruled ultra vires.
In this manner, the Privy Council established a pattern that continues to shape
Canadian federalism: where legislation is characterized as necessary to the preservation of morality and the social order, the judiciary is more likely to invoke
the tolerant doctrines of the modem paradigm; where legislation is viewed as an
interference with market relations, the judiciary is more likely to invoke the
restrictive approach of the classical paradigm.
The first insurance law challenged was an Ontario statute, upheld in Citizen's Insurance Co. v. Parsons.' In Parsons, Sir Montague Smith took great
care to interpret jurisdiction over the regulation of trade in such a manner as to
avoid overlap of federal and provincial jurisdiction. He accomplished this
objective by resorting to a process of interpretation by which the general language granting powers to each level of government must be "mutually modified" in order to preserve spheres of absolute and exclusive jurisdiction:
It becomes obvious, as soon as an attempt is made to construe the general
terms in which the classes of subjects in sects. 91 and 92 are described, that both
sections and the other parts of the Act must be looked at to ascertain whether language of a general nature must not by necessary implication or reasonable intendment be modified and limited. 67
Using this technique in order to prevent the creation of any "conflict" between
federal and provincial heads of power,68 Sir Montague Smith was able to cleanly
divide jurisdiction over trade. Federal jurisdiction over "trade and commerce"
was restricted to the regulation of interprovincial and international trade, and the
general regulation of trade affecting the whole Dominion. Provincial jurisdiction extended to intraprovincial trade: the regulation of transactions completed
solely within a province fell within exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Therefore,
federal legislation did not comprehend the power to regulate the contracts of a
particular business or trade within a province. There would be no overlap or
competition of federal and provincial powers in the regulation of the insurance
industry within the provinces.69
125; J.C. Morrison, Oliver Mowat and the Development of ProvincialRights in Ontario:A Study
in Dominion-ProvincialRelations; 1867-1896 (Toronto: Ontario Department of Public Records
and65 Archives, 1961).
See infra, notes 70-87 and accompanying text.
66(1881) 7 App. Cas. 96, 1 Cart. 265 (P.C.) [hereinafter Parsonscited to App. Cas.].
67
1bid. at 110.
68
1bid. at 109.
69

For a similar analysis, see Monahan, supra, note 38 at 57-61.
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The classical approach to the division of jurisdiction over trade adopted by
the Privy Council in Parsons frustrated persistent federal attempts at regulating
the insurance industry. In the Insurance Reference, the Privy Council held that
the federal Insurance Act 7 which prohibited insurance companies from carrying on business without a federal license, was ultra vires. The Act did not apply
to provincially-incorporated companies operating solely within the province of
incorporation. Nevertheless, Lord Haldane emphasized that the licensing provision "deprives private individuals of their liberty to carry on the business of
insurance, even when that business is confined within the limits of a prov'
The Dominion government's jurisdiction over trade and commerce did
ince."71
not extend "to the regulation by a licensing system of a particular trade in which
Canadians would otherwise be free to engage in the provinces. 72
The federal government responded by re-enacting the provisions of the Act
ruled ultra vires in the Insurance Reference and making them solely applicable
to foreign insurance companies." This approach was also turned back by the
courts on the grounds that the federal government was trying to use its power
over aliens "to intermeddle with the conduct of the insurance business."'7 4 The
federal government also tried to rely on its criminal law power by adding a provision to the Criminal Code making it an offence to carry on the business of
insurance without a license.75 The Privy Council struck down this provision as
a colourable attempt to use the criminal law "to interfere with the exercise of
civil rights in the Provinces." To uphold the federal law, stated Duff J., would
be to allow Parliament to
assume exclusive control over the exercise of any class of civil rights within the
Provinces, in respect of which exclusive jurisdiction is given to the Provinces
under s. 92, by the device of declaring those persons to be guilty of a-criminal
offence who in the exercise of such rights do not observe the conditions imposed
by the Dominion.76
Thus, federal attempts to evade the classical paradigm applied to the regulation
of markets failed.
The judicial response to the regulation of the liquor trade was markedly
different. In Russell v. R.,77 the Privy Council upheld a local option scheme for
70
InsuranceAct,
71

1910, S.C. 1910, c. 32.
Supra, note 47 at 595.

72

1bid. at 596.

73

1nsuranceAct, S.C. 1917, c. 29; An Act to Amend the Insurance Act, S.C. 1927, c. 59.
Re InsuranceAct of Canada, [1932] A.C. 41 at 51, 1 D.L.R. 97 (P.C.).
75
An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Respecting Insurance), S.C. 1917, 7-8 Geo.V, c.26,
74

amending Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1906, c. 146, now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter Criminal
Code]..
76
A.G. Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924] A.C. 328 at 340, 1 D.L.R. 789 (P.C.).

77(1882) 7 App. Cas. 829 (P.C.) [hereinafter Russell].
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the prohibition of liquor enacted by the Dominion in the Canada Temperance
Act.78 The court did not specify which head of federal power sustained the validity of the Act, although the judgment suggests that laws dealing with matters of
morality, public order and safety would fall within either the p.o.g.g. power or
the criminal law power. The court compared prohibition legislation with other
criminal and public health legislation dealing with subjects such as contagious
diseases,79 dangerous substances, 0 poisonous drugs,8 arson82 and other "evils"
and "vices." 3 In the court's words,
Laws of this nature designed for the promotion of public order, safety, or morals,
and which subject those who contravene them to criminal procedure and punish84
ment, belong to the subject of public wrongs rather than to that of civil rights.

In Hodge, the Privy Council upheld Ontario liquor licensing legislation.
Hodge, who had been convicted of operating a billiard saloon on Saturday evening in contravention of the terms of his license, unsuccessfully sought to
appeal his conviction by arguing that, after Russell, the regulation of the sale of
liquor was a matter entirely within federal jurisdiction. In rejecting this argument, the Privy Council relied on the double aspect theory: "subjects which in
one aspect and for one purpose fall within section 92, may in another aspect and
for another purpose fall within section 91. " " The pith and substance of the
Ontario Act was to promote "good government of taverns" and "to preserve, in
the municipality, peace and public decency, and repress drunkenness and disorderly and riotous conduct."86 The conclusion that the regulation of the liquor
trade was a double aspect matter was confirmed in the Local Prohibition case,
in which the Privy Council held that the provinces had the jurisdiction to enact
a local prohibition scheme very similar to that enacted by the Dominion in the
Act upheld in Russell. The court had little doubt that the provinces had jurisdiction to pass laws for "the suppression of the drink traffic as a local evil."8 7
The Russell, Hodge and Local Prohibitioncases taken together indicate
that the Privy Council was unwilling to cleanly divide jurisdiction to pass legislation over what it saw as matters relating to the preservation of morality or
public order. The court did not engage in the process of mutual modification of
powers relating to morality that it had employed in the Parsonscase to delimit
respective federal and provincial powers over trade. It resisted arguments made
78
Canada Temperance Act,
79
Supra, note 77 at 839.
8

°Ibid. at
811bid.
82
' bid. at
83
Ibid. at
14Ibid.
at
85

1878, S.C. 1878, c. 16.

838.

839.
838-41.
839.

Hodge, supra, note 37 at 130.

86

1bid. at 131.

87

Local Prohibition,supra, note 37 at 370.
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by the opponents of the liquor legislation to separate matters of local morality
from matters of national morality, and thus restrict the powers of any one government over morality as a whole. Matters of morality were, rather, a seamless
web, subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and provincial governments. In contrast, the court in Parsonstook care to divide the domain of market
regulation into its local and national aspects in such a way that overlapping,
concurrent legislation would not be tolerated.
The markets/morality dichotomy developed in the insurance and liquor
cases helps explain the manner in which the modem and classical paradigms
have been applied in constitutional cases up to the present day. Legislation that
is characterized as regulating markets will be subject to the rigid strictures of the
classical paradigm; in other words, it will have to fit into the watertight compartments of the enacting government's limited jurisdiction over markets. Legislation that is characterized as dealing with morality, public order or safety will
be subject to the more tolerant doctrines of the modem paradigm; spillover
effects on the other level of government's jurisdiction will not render such legislation invalid. Of course, legislation does not come pre-packaged with a markets or morality "tag." The characterization that is adopted is largely a matter
of judicial discretion: a great deal of legislation, like the Acts regulating the
insurance and liquor trades, regulates or prohibits market transactions in order
to prevent harm perceived to arise from the trade in, or the consumption of, particular goods or services. Whether one sees such legislation as dealing with markets or with morality (in the sense of preventing harm to others) is simply a
question of emphasis. Only certain kinds of harm will move the judiciary sufficiently to invoke the moral discourse of the modem paradigm.
The cases suggest that, apart from the trade in products associated with a
social evil, the judges perceive free markets to be presumptively free of harmful
side-effects. Thus, for example, federal legislation regulating anti-competitive
behaviour did not survive when it was coupled with substantial powers to interfere in the operation of commodity markets;8" federal anti-combines legislation
88

1n re Board of Commerce Act, [1922] 1 A.C. 191, 60 D.L.R. 513 (P.C.). A good analysis of

how the outcome of the case was affected by the judges' attitudes to market regulation can be

found in B. Hibbitts, "A Bridle for Leviathan: The Supreme Court and the Board of Commerce"
(1989) 21 Ottawa L. Rev. 65. As he notes, "there could be little doubt" that Viscount Haldane
found it "philosophically satisfying" to hold the Board of Commerce Act, S.C. 1919, c. 37, ultra
vires.

He had no love for the board as an administrative tribunal. He in fact devoted an entire
paragraph of his judgment to detailing the wide range of its powers, stressing not only
its authority over individuals of every stripe (traders and nontraders alike) and its control of prices and profits, but also its sweeping discretionary powers. As he put it (not
without some disapproval one suspects), "the Board is empowered to inquire into indi-

vidual cases and to deal with them individually, and not merely as the result of applying
principles to be laid down as of general application" (supra at 114).
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designed to facilitate the operation of free markets did survive when it was cast
in less intrusive terms and placed under the moral cloak of the CriminalCode. 9
Federal regulation of the margarine trade would have been upheld had margarine posed a plausible threat to the health of consumers; however, the discourse
of market freedom was invoked to strike down the legislation since its true purpose was to prevent harmful competition to dairy farmers.9" Similarly, federal
and provincial attempts to pass marketing legislation were struck down in the
1920s and 1930s as a result of the application of the rigid strictures of the classical paradigm. 9' As a result, the courts placed the country in a "constitutional
straitjacket" 92 by creating a "no man's land" in which neither level of govemment could effectively regulate the economy.93 In 1937, F.R. Scott described the
situation as follows:
The history of recent cases dealing with the control of trade and commerce
in Canada shows a fairly consistent attitude in the courts against control, an attitude which overrides any feeling for or against provincial autonomy ...
Dominion
control over the grain trade was successfully attacked in King v. EasternTerminal
Elevators, while a provincial attempt at a compulsory wheat pool was similarly
held ultra vires. A provincial marketing scheme was set aside as interfering with
interprovincial trade and commerce in the Lawson Case, and now the Dominion
Marketing act is destroyed because it interferes with provincial trade. A provincial
attempt to regulate the production and prevent wastage of gas and oil in the Turner
Valley fields was frustrated. It would seem that even without special attention in
the British North America Act, the doctrines
of laissez-faire are in practice receiv94
ing ample protection from the courts.

See also G. Le Dain, "Sir Lyman Duff and the Constitution" (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 261 at
278.
89
PA.TA. v. A.-G. Canada, [1931] A.C. 310 (P.C.).
90
Can. Fed. of Agriculture v. A.G. Que. (MargarineReference), [1949] S.C.R. 1, 1 D.L.R. 433,
aff'd [1951] A.C. 179, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 689 (P.C.). While Parliament can regulate for a "public purpose" such as "public peace, order, security, health, morality" pursuant to its criminal law power,
Rand J. concluded that the "public interest" does not extend to intervening in local markets in pursuit of a trade policy. Parliament cannot, under s. 91(27),
benefit one group of persons as against competitors in business in which, in the absence
of legislation, the latter would be free to engage in the provinces. To forbid manufacture and sale for such an end is prima facie to deal directly with the civil rights of individuals in relation to a particular trade within the provinces (supra at 50).
91
R. v. Eastern TerminalElevator, [1925] S.C.R. 434, 3 D.L.R. 1; Lawson v. InteriorTree Fruit
and Vegetable Committee, supra, note 37; In re Grain Marketing Act, [1931] 2 W.W.R. 146, 25
Sask. L.R. 273 (C.A.); Lower Mainland Dairy Products v. Crystal Dairy, [1933] A.C. 168, 1
D.L.R. 82 (P.C.); A.G. Canadav. A.G. Ontario (NaturalProductsMarketing), [1937] A.C. 377,
1 D.L.R. 688 (P.C.).
92
P.C. Weiler, "The Supreme Court and the Law of Canadian Federalism" (1973) 23 U.T.L.J. 307
at 93
309.
F.R. Scott, "The Privy Council and Mr. Bennett's 'New Deal' Legislation" (1937) 3 Can. J.
Econ. & Poli. Sci. 234 at 240: "The courts have created a no man's land in the constitution and
are able to invalidate any marketing legislation they do not like."
94
F.R. Scott, "The Privy Council and Mr. Bennett's 'New Deal' Legislation," rev'd and reprinted
in Scott, supra, note 38, 90 at 101.
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Markets simply do not fit neatly within watertight compartments of jurisdiction. To this day, the judicial activism inherent in the classical paradigm places marketing legislation and federal attempts to regulate the national economy
on hazardous constitutional terrain. 95
Similarly, the pattern of allowing concurrent operation of prohibition laws
that began with the Russell and Local Prohibition decisions can be traced
through a series of more recent cases that have allowed for the concurrent operation of federal and provincial laws in the domains of morality and public order.
For example, the regulation of immoral competitive behaviour such as fraudulent practices96 and insider trading in federal securities,97 the confinement of nar-

cotic drug users,9" the regulation of drunk driving99 and other highway traffic
offences,"° public nudity,"0 ' disorderly houses, 1°2 obscene films,0 3 and public
assemblies"° have all been found to be double aspect matters.
The above survey is necessarily a partial account of the history of the manner in which the courts have applied the modem and classical paradigms to the
interpretation of the division of powers. No doubt different accounts could be
constructed from the examination of areas of jurisdiction other than those discussed above. Nevertheless, the striking contrast in the pattern of decisionmaking in the moral and market domain respectively enables one to conclude
that values that should have no constitutional significance are playing a role in
the interpretation of the division of powers. Judicial resistance to the regulation
of markets, and judicial tolerance of moral regulation have contributed to the
shape of Canadian constitutional doctrine. The degree to which regulation of
95
Regarding marketing legislation, compare, e.g., CarnationCo. v. Quebec AgriculturalMarketing Board, [1968] S.C.R. 238, 67 D.L.R. (2d) 1 with A.G. Man. v. Man. Egg and Poultry Association, [19711 S.C.R. 689, 19 D.L.R. (3d) 169 and Burns Foods v. A.G. Man., [1975] 1 S.C.R.
494, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 731, and see Weiler, supra, note 92 at 333-38. Regarding federal regulation

of the economy, see LabattBreweries v. A.-G. Can., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914, 9 B.L.R. 181; Dominion
Stores v. R., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 844, 106 D.L.R. (3d) 581. For a detailed analysis of these latter two

cases, see J.C. MacPherson, "Economic Regulation and the B.N.A. Act" (1980-81) 5 Can. Bus.
L.J. 172 (concluding (at 174) that "the constitutional basis for federal economic legislation has
never been shakier").
96

Smith v. R., [1960] S.C.R. 776, 25 D.L.R. (2d) 225.

97

Multiple Access, supra, note 54.

9

Schneider v. The Queen, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112, (sub nom. Schneider v. B.C.) 68 C.C.C. (2d) 449.
ProvincialSecretary of P.EJ. v. Egan, supra, note 47.

99

'°°O'Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804, 25 D.L.R. (2d) 145; Mann v. R., [1966] S.C.R. 238,
56 D.L.R. (2d) 1; Stephens v. R., [1960] S.C.R. 823, 25 D.L.R. (2d) 296; Francisv. R., [1988] 1
S.C.R. 1025, 41 C.C.C. (3d) 217 [hereinafter Franciscited to S.C.R.].
1"1Rio Hotel Ltd. v. New Brunswick (LiquorLicense Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 59,44 D.L.R. (4th)

663.

10 2Bedard v. Dawson, [1923] S.C.R. 681, 4 D.L.R. 293.
10 3Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 662, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
1'A.G. Can. and Dupond v. Montreal, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770, (sub nom. A.G. Can. v. Montreal)
84 D.L.R. (3d) 420.
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markets or morals is desirable is an issue that ought to be left to the politically
accountable branches of government.
While a case can be made that the classical paradigm reflects a deregulatory bias that has been applied to the market domain, at the same time it is frequently noted that it plays an important role in the promotion of provincial
autonomy. While a market bias is not a legitimate value to be applied to the
interpretation of the division of powers, the promotion of provincial autonomy
is an important constitutional value in a federal state. Because these two values
are frequently entangled in cases invoking the classical paradigm, it is a challenge to evaluate the constitutional legitimacy of particular decisions. It is necessary that we meet this challenge by attempting to untangle the values animating the use of doctrine in order to remove the application of the classical and
modem paradigms from any illegitimate biases that have helped shape their
application and put them to the service of legitimate constitutional values.
A good example of a decision in which the market bias and autonomist features of the classical paradigm are both visible is the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Bell 1988.105 The case provokes a sense of d6j vu: a 1966
case that involved the same company and a similar factual and legal configuration, Commission d Salaire Minimum v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada,"° is
also a leading example of the application of the classical paradigm. In both the
1966 and 1988 cases, Bell Canada succeeded in using federalism arguments to
avoid the application of Quebec labour laws.
In Bell 1966, the Supreme Court had to decide whether employees of Bell
Telephone in Quebec were entitled to the protection of the Quebec Minimum
Wage Act. 7 There was no question that the Quebec law was a valid exercise of
provincial legislative authority over "property and civil rights"; and at the time
there was no federal minimum wage.1 8 Yet the court invoked the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to read down the provincial law, on the grounds that
the provinces lacked the power to pass legislation affecting a vital part of the
management and operation of a federal undertaking.
In the few decades since it was decided, Bell 1966 seemed to be a precedent resting on increasingly shaky ground. It had been forcefully criticized in
the scholarly literature."° And in O.P.S.E.U., Dickson C.J. and Lamer J. both
'05Supra, note 42. The case was part of a trilogy of cases dealing with the constitutional scope
of application of provincial health and safety legislation. See also Alltrans Express Ltd. v. British

Columbia (Workers' CompensationBoard), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 897, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 253 and C.N.R.
Co. v. Courtois, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 868, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 271.

106[1966] S.C.R. 767, 59 D.L.R. (2d) 145 [hereinafter Bell 1966 cited to S.C.R.].
"TR.S.Q. 1941, c. 164.

'05The CanadaLabourStandards Code, S.C. 1964-65, c.38, came into force on March 18, 1965,
after the litigation had been initiated.
1'9See Weiler, supra, note 92 at 340-42; Gibson, supra, note 45 at 53-56; Hogg, supra, note 3

at 329-32 & 465-66; and infra, note 191.
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were willing to overrule McKay v. R.," ° a case that also applied the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to preserve exclusive federal jurisdiction from
encroachment by otherwise valid provincial legislation. In O.P.S.E.U., Dickson
C.J. stated that he favoured "caution" in the application of the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine:
The history of Canadian constitutional law has been to allow for a fair amount of
interplay and indeed overlap between provincial and federal powers. It is true that
doctrines like interjurisdictional and Crown immunity and concepts like "watertight compartments" qualify the extent of that interplay. But it must be recognized
that these doctrines and concepts have not been the dominant tide of constitutional
doctrines; rather, they have been an undertow against the strong pull of pith and
substance, the aspect doctrine and, in recent years, a very restrained approach to
concurrency and paramountcy issues ... 1

In the Bell 1988 case, the court did not feel the "strong pull" of the modem paradigm; rather, it applied the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine embodied in
Bell 1966 and other cases.
The issue in Bell 1988 was whether the Quebec Act Respecting OccupationalHealth and Safety"2 could apply to federal undertakings situate within the
province. Beetz J., writing for a unanimous court, held that it could not. In doing
so, he wrote a lengthy and scholarly judgment that reads like a textbook on the
classical paradigm in Canadian federalism. One would never know from reading the judgment that there exists a competing approach to the interpretation of
the meaning of exclusivity in the division of powers.
He began by pointing out that the pith and substance of the Quebec Act was
the regulation of working conditions, labour relations and the management of
undertakings. As these are matters that fall within s. 92(13), the Act was therefore intra vires the province." 3 However, Beetz J. endorsed the broadest possible definition of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine that could be drawn

from the cases:. 4

110[1965] S.C.R. 798, 53 D.L.R. (2d) 532.

note 1 at 18.
I'Supra,
" 2S.Q. 1979, c.63 (now R.S.Q. c. S-2.1) [hereinafter OccupationalHealth and Safety Act].
3
11Supra, note 42 at 816.
" 4The doctrine originated in cases in which provincial laws were held inapplicable to federally
incorporated companies if they had the effect of "impairing" or "sterilizing" a company's operations. John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton, [1915] A.C. 330, 18 D.L.R. 353 (P.C.); Great West Saddlery Co. v. R., [1921] 2 A.C. 91, 58 D.L.R. 1 (P.C.). This test was later adopted to grant a similar
immunity from the application of valid provincial laws to undertakings within federal jurisdiction.
See A.-G. Ont. v. Winner, [1954] A.C. 541, 13 W.W.R. 657 (P.C.) and Campbell-Bennett Ltd. v.
Comstock Midwestern Ltd., [1954] S.C.R. 207, 3 D.L.R. 481.
It would be difficult to argue that provincial labour legislation would impair or sterilize federal
undertakings if applied to them. However, a more stringent test was ultimately articulated that prevents provincial minimum wage legislation and other labour legislation from applying to federal
undertakings. In the cases involving labour legislation, the Court abandoned the "impairment" test
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Parliament is vested with exclusive legislative jurisdiction over labour relations
and working conditions when that jurisdiction is an integral part of its primary and
exclusive jurisdiction over another class of subjects, as is the case with labour relations and working conditions in the federal undertakings covered by ss. 91(29) and
92(10)a., b. and c. of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 ... It follows that this primary and
exclusive jurisdiction precludes the application to those undertakings of provincial
statutes relating to labour relations and working conditions, since such matters are
an essential part of the very management and operation of such undertakings ...115
Beetz J. then undertook a lengthy evaluation of the provisions of the Occttpational Health and Safety Act to determine whether its application would

affect a "vital or essential part" of federal undertakings like Bell Canada." 6 In
fact, he spent forty pages of the judgment belabouring the obvious point that the
Quebec Act interfered with the power of management in the employment con-

text." 7 For this reason, it could not apply to federal undertakings:

in entering the field of prevention of accidents in the workplace, as the legislator
has the power to do, and in using, as probably could not be avoided in prevention
matters, means such as the right of refusal, protective re-assignment, detailed regulations, inspection and remedial orders to "establishments" within the meaning of
the Act ... the legislator could not fail to enter directly and massively into the field
in favour of a test that prohibited the application of provincial legislation to federal undertakings
when it would affect "a vital or essential part of the operation as a going concern." See, e.g., Reference re Minimum Wage Act of Saskatchewan, [1948] S.C.R. 248, 3 D.L.R. 801; Reference re
IndustrialRelations and Disputes Investigation Act, [1955] S.C.R. 529, 3 D.L.R. 72; Bell 1966,
supra, note 106 at 771-72. It was this latter test that Beetz J. followed in Bell 1988:
In order for the inapplicability of provincial legislation rule to be given effect, it is
sufficient that the provincial statute which purports to apply to the federal undertaking
affects a vital or essential part of that undertaking, without necessarily going as far as
impairing or paralyzing it (supra, note 42 at 859-60).
" 5lbid. at 761-62.
116The Act sets up a comprehensive scheme for the protection of workers from occupational hazards. The aim of the Act is set out in s. 2: "the elimination, at the source, of dangers to the health,
safety and physical well-being of workers." Amongst other rights, the Act gives workers a right
to refuse unsafe work (s. 12) and to collect regular wages while refusing such work (s. 14). A
woman who believes that her working conditions may endanger her unborn child has a right to be
reassigned to duties involving no such danger (s. 40). Chapter IV of the Act, which Beetz J.
described as "crucial" (ibid. at 786), allows workers to set up health and safety committees (ss
68-9) which are granted wide-ranging powers of participation in the management of the workplace
(s. 78).
117The following are some examples of Beetz J.'s emphasis on the Act's interference with management power in the workplace: "it is the very management and managerial authority in its
entirety which the Act regulates" (ibid. at 812); it "aims at and regulates the management and operations of an undertaking" (supra at 810 & 814); it "appears to have been primarily motivated by
a desire not to leave any aspect of the management and operation out" (supra at 814); it "creates
a system of partial co-management of the undertaking by the workers and the employer" (supra
at 810); it confers "managerial functions" on workers' representatives (supra at 811); it "interven[es] at the heart of the contract of employment between the worker and the employer" (supra
at 801); it "authorize[s] workers to withhold their services" (supra at 802); and it confers on the
worker "rights which he or she may assert chiefly against the employer" (supra at 808).
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of working conditions and labour relations on the one hand and, on the other ...
into the field of the management and operation of undertakings. In so doing, the
itself from aiming at and regulating federal undertakings by
legislator precluded
the Act. 1

Beetz J. had stated earlier in the judgment that the purpose of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is to preserve a core area of exclusive federal jurisdiction, the core being defined by those subjects which "bear on the specifically

federal nature of the jurisdiction.""..9 While the litany of interferences with managerial prerogatives Beetz J. found in the legislative scheme is clearly problematic given the definition of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine he adopted,
it is not at all obvious why protecting the health and safety of workers, or management power more generally, "bears on the specifically federal nature of the
jurisdiction" over interprovincial communication and transportation undertakings. Rather than focusing on a functional analysis of federal jurisdiction, his
approach suggests that one determines whether the scope of a provincial law
ought to be limited under the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine by measuring the degree to which it interferes with management power in the workplace.
In addition to affirming a broad interpretation of the interjurisdictional

immunity, Beetz J. argued that the "double aspect" theory "ought to be applied
only with great caution": 20

The double aspect theory is neither an exception nor even a qualification to
the rule of exclusive legislative jurisdiction. Its effect must not be to create concurrent fields of jurisdiction, such as agriculture, immigration and old age pensions and supplementary benefits, in which Parliament and the legislatures may
legislate on the same aspect. On the contrary, the double aspect theory can only
be invoked when it gives effect to the rule of exclusive fields of jurisdiction. As
its name indicates, it can only be applied2 in clear cases where the multiplicity of
aspects is real and not merely nominal.1 1
In this case, the Quebec legislature, and the federal government in enacting the
almost identical occupational health and safety provisions in the Canada
Labour Code,' were both "pursuing the same objective by similar techniques
and means."'" For Beetz J., the "exact correspondence" of the objectives of the
federal and provincial occupational health and safety legislation
indicates that there are not two aspects and two purposes depending on whether
the legislation is federal or provincial. In my opinion, the two legislators have legislatedfor the same purpose and in the same aspect. Yet they do not have concur"lbid. at
at
1191bid.
120Ibid. at
121lbid. at

798.
833.
706, quoting Lord Haldane in Insurance Reference.
766.

'22R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, ss 79, 79.1 & 80-106.1.
l13Bell 1988, supra, note 42 at 852.
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rent legislative
jurisdiction in the case at bar, but mutually exclusive jurisdic24
tions.1

Beetz J. offered two rationales for his thoroughgoing application of these
features of the classical paradigm. First, he argued that overlapping legislation
should be avoided as much as possible because it is inefficient and wasteful
of administrative resources. After quoting Hogg's criticisms of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine,"z Beetz J. responded:
It is an argument which relies on a spirit of contradiction between systems of
regulation, investigation, inspection and remedial notices which are increasingly
complex, specialized and perhaps inevitably, highly detailed. A division of jurisdiction in this area is likely to be a source of uncertainty and endless disputes in
which the courts will be called on to decide whether a conflict exists between the
most trivial federal and provincial regulations, such as those specifying the thickness or colour of safety boots or hard hats.
Furthermore, in the case of occupational health and safety, such a twofold
jurisdiction is likely to promote the proliferation of preventive measures and controls in which the contradictions or lack of coordination may well threaten the very
occupational health and safety which are sought to be protected.
Federalism requires most persons and institutions to serve two masters; however, in my opinion an effort must126be made to see that this dual control applies as
far as possible in separate areas.
There is validity to the concern that overlap may frustrate the common goals of
both levels of government; it is, at the very least, wasteful of administrative
resources. But concerns about the desirable scope of government regulation are
best left to the politically accountable branches of government unless there is
tangible evidence that overlap is frustrating the accomplishment of the legislative goals. If so, the paramountcy doctrine should be invoked, for its role is to
prevent such an operational conflict by rendering the provincial legislation inoperative. However, throughout the judgment Beetz J. pointed to the similarity
between the federal and Quebec legislation, and did not describe how their overlap was creating discord rather than harmony.
The other rationale that Beetz . offered in defence of the classical paradigm was the promotion of provincial autonomy. There is good reason to be
concerned that the full-fledged application of the modem paradigm will seriously undermine provincial autonomy. As Beetz J. explained:
The reason for this caution is the extremely broad wording of the exclusive
legislative powers listed in ss 91 and 92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 and the risk
that these two fields of exclusive powers will be combined into a single more or
less concurrent field of powers governed solely by the rule of paramountcy of fed'24 Ibid. at 853.
l25Supra, note 3 at 328-32.
126Supra, note 42 at 843-44.
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eral legislation. Nothing could be more directly contrary to the principle of federalism underlying the Canadian Constitution ...127
This argument is compelling as a critique of the modem paradigm, but should
it lead us to embrace the classical approach to exclusivity as Beetz J. suggests?
Should we be troubled by the apparent paradox of asserting provincial auton-

omy as a defence for a result that limits the scope of a provincial law so that
workers in Quebec have fewer rights than their neighbours simply because they
happen to work for a federal undertaking? In the next section, I will explore the
relationship of the classical paradigm to provincial autonomy in more detail
through an examination of the works of Qurbrcois scholars before reaching any
definite conclusions about the desireability of the interpretive strategy employed
by Beetz J. in Bell 1988.
HI.

The Paradigms and Provincial Autonomy
The future of confederation absolutely depends on the faithful and exact observance of the federal compact. ... for the true patriot nothing is more important or,
should we say, is more sacred than the cause of provincial autonomy.
- P.B. Mignault' 22

For Qurbdcois constitutional scholars, the protection of provincial autonomy was the raison d'etre of the adoption of a federal constitution in Canada,

and represents the supreme value that ought to guide the interpretation of the
division of powers. 29 In the understated style of the authors of the milestone
1271bid. at 766. Beetz J. also quoted the following passage from Laskin's CanadianConstitutional Law casebook:
Since most matters potentially have a "double aspect," particularly given the broad
wording of the major federal and provincial powers, it is difficult to draw logical lines
creating separate enclaves of exclusive jurisdiction. Restated, it is difficult to identify
cases on a purely logical basis where the aspect doctrine will not be applied. The practical difficulty with applying the aspect doctrine to the fullest extent of its logic is that
the resulting federal and provincial functional concurrency would liken our system to
that in the United Kingdom where Parliament can always override municipal institutions. Through the operation of the paramountcy doctrine in Canada, federal legislation
would supersede provincial legislation across the entire legislative field. This is, obviously, completely at odds with the notion of Canadian federalism (N. Finkelstein,
Laskin's CanadianConstitutionalLaw, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 525).
The same point is made by Lederman, "The Balanced Interpretation of the Federal Distribution of
Legislative Powers in Canada," supra, note 51 at 278, and by a number of the authors discussed
in Part III, below.
128P.B. Mignault, Manuel de droit parlementaire(Montreal: Librairie de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1889) at 332-33 (translation from the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on ConstitutionalProblems, vol. 2 (Province of Quebec, 1956) at 179, n. 4 [hereinafter Tremblay Report].
129The account which follows summarizes the views of those Qurbrcois scholars whose writings
share a commitment to the protection of provincial autonomy and a concern with the proper interpretation of the division of powers in light of that commitment. In the writing of these scholars
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report of the Quebec Royal Commission on Constitutional Problems, "[p]rovincial autonomy, therefore, is something valuable."'30 Indeed, the organizing
theme of the Tremblay Report is the degree to which governmental practices and
judicial interpretation of the division of powers have fostered a true federalism
in which each level of government is equal, coordinate, and autonomous within
its sphere of exclusive jurisdiction. A federal state, in the words of the Tremblay
Report, requires
a division between two orders of government, co-ordinate with each other, and
with each of them enjoyin3 supreme authority in the sphere of activity assigned
to it by the Constitution.
The Qu6brcois people agreed to Confederation only on the understanding that
the Quebec state "would enjoy all the autonomy needed to preserve and develop
its national life."' 3 If the Canadian constitution guarantees less than full autonomy to Quebec in the organization of its national life, then it was "a fool's bargain": 133
Quebec sees with an anxious eye every federal intervention in fields which touch
very closely upon the national life of its French-Canadian population ...
To ensure
its life, it has need of the full measure
of
autonomy
and
sovereignty
which
the fed134
erative compact guaranteed to it.
While the authors of the Report applauded the Privy Council for creating
an "authentic federalism"' 35 through its interpretation of the division of powone finds an in-depth exploration of the relationship of Canadian federal interpretive practices to
provincial autonomy.
The protection of provincial autonomy is not a central concern in all Qubdcois constititutional
scholarship (see, e.g., G.A. Beaudoin, La constitution du Canada, 2d ed. (Montreal: Wilson &
Lafleur, 1990)). And, of course, a commitment to promoting the autonomy of the Quebec state has
led many to look beyond issues regarding the interpretation of the existing constitution and concentrate on advocating new constitutional arrangements that would recognize Quebec's special status within Canada or other wide-ranging amendments to the federal constitution. See E. McWhinney, "Quebec Constitutional Theory" in Quebec andthe Constitution 1960-78 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1979) 21; A. Dufour, "Le Statut Particulier" (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 437; J.
Brossard, "La revolution frdrraliste" (1972) 7 R.J.T. 1; J. Brossard, "Fdd&alisme et statut particulier" in A. Popovici dir., Problemes de droit contemporain (Montrdal: P.U.M., 1974); J.-Y.
Morin, "Le f~ddralisme canadien apr~s cent ans" (1967) 2 R.J.T. 13; A.G. Gagnon & J. Garcea,
"Quebec and the Pursuit of Special Status" in R.D. Oiling & M.W. Westmacott, eds, Perspectives
on CanadianFederalism (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1988) 304.
13Iremblay Report, vol. 2, supra, note 128 at 179.
31
' Ibid. at 151.
1321bid. at 153.
1331bid. at 156.
'34Ibid.
at 185.
1351bid. at 165 & 171. For some of the classic statements by the Privy Council emphasizing the
need for a strict adherence to the federal principle in order to preserve provincial autonomy, see
supra, note 37.
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ers, 136 they expressed deep concern that the federal government's post-war policies, particularly its assertion of unlimited federal taxation and spending pow-

ers, had imposed on Canada "only a quasi-federative system."' 37

A similar emphasis on the priority of provincial autonomy as a constitutional value runs through generations of scholarship by Quebec jurists. In addition to challenging the centralist tendencies of the federal government's postwar policies, Qudhrcois scholars have lamented any departure by the Supreme
Court from the path of constitutional interpretation established by the Privy
Council during its tenure as Canada's final court of appeal.
For example, in a 1951 article,' 38 Pigeon offered an eloquent defence of the
Privy Council's constitutional legacy in the name of provincial autonomy. He
emphasized that "autonomy means the right of being different,' ' 139 which for a
province means "the privilege of defining its own policies."'40 In marked contrast to anglo-Canadian scholars of the time, who tended to criticize the Privy
Council for taking a narrow, technical or ahistorical approach to constitutional
interpretation, 4 ' Pigeon praised the Privy Council for interpreting the B.N.A.
Act from the "higher view"' 42 of provincial autonomy:
the courts have consistently refused to allow any particular clause of the B.N.A.
Act to be construed in a way that would enable the federal Parliament to invade
the provincial sphere of action outside of emergencies ... The decisions ... firmly
uphold the fundamental principle of provincial autonomy: they staunchly refuse to
let our federal constitution be changed gradually, by one device or another, to a
the essential condition of the
legislative union. In doing
143 so they are preserving
Canadian confederation.

Pigeon's views are reflected in the work of subsequent Qurb6cois scholars,
who tend to use the Privy Council jurisprudence as a benchmark against which
to measure the performance of the Supreme Court of Canada in constitutional
cases since it took over as the final court of appeal in 1949. For example, the
Supreme Court has given a broader interpretation than the Privy Council did to
the major federal powers, particularly the trade and commerce power and the
p.o.g.g. power. While anglo-Canadian scholars have tended to write from a
functional perspective that applauds an expansion of the federal government's
136The authors state that the Privy Council has been reproached "with only one thing - having
prevented the central government from transforming the federative union into a legislative union"
(ibid.
at 163).
37
Ibid. at 171.
138L.-P. Pigeon, "The Meaning of Provincial Autonomy" (1951) 29 Can. Bar Rev. 1126.
139Ibid. at 1133.
14Olbid.

141For useful overviews of anglo-Canadian analyses of the Privy Council jurisprudence, see
supra, note 38, and Bakan, supra, note 38.
Cairns,
142Supra, note 138 at 1135.
1431bid. at 1134-35.
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ability to deal with problems of a national scope, Qu6b6cois scholars have
warned that the Supreme Court's approach threatens provincial autonomy. In a
1968 study, Jacques Brossard concluded that the Supreme Court "parait s'61oigner de plus en plus de la jurisprudence provincialiste 6tablie par le Comit6

judiciaire. ' "' The path followed by the Court

s'61oigne, parfois considdrablement, du f~d6ralisme authentique vers lequel tendait le Comit6 judiciaire et parait s'av6rer de plus en plus
45 p6rilleuse pour les provinces et le Qu6bec dont les intdr~ts sont sp6cifiques.1

Amongst the many Qu6b6cois scholars who have agreed with Brossard's
assessment and shared his concerns, the most common response has been to
advocate that the courts adhere scrupulously to the doctrinal features of the classical paradigm. On the view of the autonomist supporters of the classical paradigm, the autonomy of the provinces is best protected if judges interpret the
constitutional exclusivity of legislative powers in the strong, classical sense:
there should be as little overlap of federal and provincial legislative powers as
possible. The watertight compartments
metaphor is embroidered on the flag of
146
the classical autonomist.
The importance of a strong understanding of exclusivity to provincial
autonomy is carefully analyzed in the work of scholars such as Andr6 Tremblay, 47 Pierre Patenaude 4 and Gil R~millard. 149 Tremblay recognizes that "le
partage des comp6tences ne pourra 6riger de cloisons 6tanches entre les fonc14J. Brossard, La cour supreme et la constitution:Leforum constitutionnelau Canada (Montreal:
P.U.M., 1968) at 244.
145Ibid. at 216. See also J. Brossard, "La revolution f6draliste," supra, note 129 at 2; A. Tremblay, Les compitences ligislativesau Canadaet les pouvoirsprovinciauxen matieres de propriltg
et de droits civils (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 1967). Tremblay noted that the Supreme Court's
resuscitation of the national dimensions branch of the p.o.g.g. power was "lourd de danger pour
l'autonomie des provinces" (supra at 294-5). In addition, he noted that, in the domain of trade and
commerce, "les principes pos6s apparaissent peu respectueux de l'autonomie des provinces... la
cloison plac6e entre le commerce local et le commerce ext~rieur n'est plus 6tanche qu'autrefois"
(supra
at 198-99).
146See, e.g., Bonenfant, supra, note 9 at 384:
Jusqu'h ces derniers temps, on regardait comme un principe bien 6tabli du droit constitutionnel canadien la r6flexion presque podtique faite par Lord Atkin I la fin de la
d6cision du Comit6 judiciare du Conseil priv6 dans L'Affaire des Conventions du Travail, t savoir que... "bien que le navire de l'ttat (canadien) vogue maintenant vers des
horizons plus vastes et sur des mers dtrang~res, i conserve encore des compartiments
6tanches, parties essentielles de sa structure premiere."
' 47
A.
Tremblay, Precis de droit constitutionnel (Montreal: Th6mis, 1982).
148Patenaude, supra, note 9; P. Patenaude, "The Right to Flourish According to One's Own Culture" in Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada, The Constitution and the Future
of Canada
(Toronto: De Boo, 1978) 37.
149G. Rdmillard, "Des diffdrentes esptces de comp6tences l6gislatives et de leurs grands principes d'interpr~tation" (1976) 36 R. du B. 672; G. R~millard, "Souverainet6 et fdd6ralisme" (1979)
20 C. de D. 237; G. Rmillard, Le fiddralisme canadien, 2d ed., vol. 1 (Montreal: Qu6bec/
Amdrique, 1983).
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tions attribures aux deux paliers de gouvemement."' 50 While a pure watertight
compartments approach may be impossible in practice, he argues that it should
be strived for as much as possible. 5 ' In his analysis, there are two problems with
the judicial creation of areas of overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction: it compromises the federal principle by threatening provincial autonomy,'52 and it
compromises the democratic principle by rendering accountability more difficult as a result of blurred legislative responsibilities.' 53

For Patenaude, any departure from the watertight compartments approach

to exclusivity is a menace to the autonomy of Quebec.'54 He criticizes the erosion of the prohibition on inter-delegation of legislative power articulated by the
Supreme Court in 1949 in Nova Scotia Inter-delegation; cases like Coughlin
and Scott now make it possible for the principle of exclusivity to be compromised by the transfer of powers from the provinces to the federal government
or vice versa.' 55 And he deplores the liberal application of the ancillary powers
doctrine and the double aspect doctrine, which create areas of overlapping jurisdiction in which the federal government is supreme by virtue of federal

paramountcy:
Tout affaiblissement de la r~gle de l'exclusivit6 signifie la possibilit6 pour le Parlement frdrral, oa les francophones sont minoritaires, de l6gifdrer, avec pr66minence, dans des domaines que les constituants avaient confirs de fagon exclusive

au Parlement des Qurbrcois ...
Les Qurb6cois ne peuvent accepter que des
domaines de competence sur lesquels ilsont un contr6le exclusif puissent, sous
couvert de la th~orie de l'aspect, passer dans le champ oii s'applique prioritairement la competence f6drrale.
L'affaiblissement de la r~gle de 1'exclusivit6 conduit en effet A la cr6ation de
domaines de competence concurrente, ce qui est tout 4 56
l'avantage du pouvoir fdral puisqu'il brndficie de la rfgle de prdpond6rance.1

Until new constitutional arrangements are made that better secure the autonomy
of Quebec, Patenaude concludes, the Supreme Court should "respecter scrupuleusement la r~gle de l'exclusivit6."' 57
150
Supra, note 147 at 94.
151Ibid. at 191 ("Ici comme ailleurs une rpartition plus claire des responsabilitrs entre Ottawa
et les provinces ne saurait etre que brn6fique.").
152"Il
est donc essentiel que ce partage des pouvoirs existe pour qu'un tel 6tat soit dit frdrral.
I1faut aussi que l'amrnagement des comp~tences soit clairement 6tabli...
il faut la delimiter [la
competence] avec soin. Le frdrralisme vdritable est incompatible avec l'attribution A un palier de
gouvemement d'un pouvoir de decision qui, par example, drtruirait progressivement l'autonomie
des collectivit6s f~d& es... Sans ce partage, il n'y aurait pas de vritable frdrration et le rgime
politique ressemblerait A celui de l'6tat unitaire." Ibid. at 92-93.
153"1 est en effet indispensable que les responsabilitrs soient bien partagres de fagon ce que
le citoyen puisse savoir tqui s'addresser et aussi h qui demander des comptes." Ibid.at 92, n. 196.
154Supra, note 9.
'55Ibid. at 231.
1561bid. at 234.
1571bid. at 235.
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R6millard places similar emphasis on the principle of exclusivity, which he
defines as "'attribution d'un monopole l6gislatif qui ne doit souffrir aucune
limitation."'58 Like Patenaude, he notes that the rule prohibiting legislative interdelegation of powers is related to this strict understanding of exclusivity.'59 Like
Tremblay, he recognizes that some overlap of provincial and federal powers
cannot be avoided. Within those areas of overlap, the federal and provincial
governments are not equal and autonomous. Rather, the paramountcy rule
reflects a hierarchical conception of powers - the provinces are subordinate to
the superior (paramount) authority of the federal government."6 For this reason,
he argues that doctrines that give rise to areas of overlapping powers - such
as the double aspect doctrine and the ancillary powers doctrine - ought to be
applied with great caution.' In the end, he suggests that the cause of provincial
autonomy is furthered by promoting as much as possible the "6tanch6it6" of the
division of powers:
Le moins que l'on puisse dire, c'est que cette "6tanch6it6" est maintenant fortement menace. Rares, en effet, sont les comp~tences 1gislatives accord6es
exclusivement aux provinces de par le texte de l'Acte de 1867, qui ne font pas,
d'une fagon directe ou indirecte, l'objet d'une 16gislation f~d6rale. De fait, notre
f6d6ralisme est de plus en plus bas6 sur des comp6tences devenus mixtes de par
l'interprdtation judiciare, ce qui n'est pas sans mettre en danger le respect du principe de
l'autonomie des ttats f~d6r6s, qui est ]a base de tout lEtat vraiment f6d62
ratif.1

Perhaps the clearest articulation of a similar classical autonomist view was
put forward by Professor Jean Beetz (as he then was) in 1965,63 many years
before he was able to give those views judicial expression in the Bell 1988 case.
In line with the views later expressed by R6millard and Patenaude, Beetz
believed that any extension of concurrent areas of jurisdiction posed a threat to
provincial autonomy: "I1 suffirait ... d'6tendre le champ de la comp6tence com158Le fidralisme canadien, supra, note 149 at 282.
1591bid. at 283.
16"Souverainet6 et f~d6ralisme," supra, note 149 at 245. For these reasons, Rdmillard argues
that the provincial governments cannot properly be described as sovereign; they are, rather, autonomous, in the sense that they have "la libert6 d'agir dans un cadre donna et sous une autorit6 sup6rieure"
(supra at 244).
1610n the double aspect doctrine: "I1 va sans dire qu'une telle th6orie peut mettre en cause
s6rieusement la souverainet6 des provinces. Rares sont les domaines de 16gislation qui sous certains aspects ne pr~sentent pas d'l6ments pouvant d~couler des comp6tences fdd6rales" (ibid. at
242). On the ancillary powers doctrine: "Le pouvoir implicite a donc des consequences des plus
importantes puisqu'il permet pratiquement de bouleverser le partage des comp6tences l~gislatives
originellement pr6vu dans la constitution f~d~rale. Les tribunaux doivent donc se montrer particuli~rement
prudents dans son application" (Lef~d~ralisme canadien, supra, note 149 at 295).
162
1bid. at 307.
63
1 J. Beetz, "Les attitudes changeantes du Qu6bec t l'endroit de ]a Constitution de 1867" in Crdpeau & Macpherson, eds, supra, note 43, 113. For an overview of Beetz's classical approach to
federalism as a scholar and judge, see Swinton, supra, note 38 at 259-291.
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mune pour augmenter du meme coup la supr6matie f6drale."1 64 Beetz
expressed concern regarding the extension of concurrency in terms that echo his
judgment in Bell 1988:
le juriste qudb~cois sera port6 s'inqui~ter de la tendance ... vers une extension
des comp~tences communes: il lui semble que l'adoption de deux lois, l'une fdd6rale, l'autre provinciale, toutes deux destinies A rdgir la meme activit6 mat6rielle,

toutes deux adoptdes dans le m~me but et sous le m~me aspect, est clairement
exclue par la constitution sauf en mati~re d'agriculture, d'immigration, et de penla zone de
sion de vieillesse; mais surtout, cette tendance a pour effet d'6tendre
165
suprdmatie des lois f~drales; elle est nettement centralisatrice.

It follows from this view that provincial autonomy is best preserved by seeking
to eliminate any areas of overlap between federal and provincial powers; as
Beetz put it, the goal is to reduce "zones of contact" between the two levels of
government:
La protection de l'identit6 qu6b~coise est d'abord d'une nature juridique plut6t
que politique ... L'objet consiste Ar6duire les zones de contact entre une majorit6
trop forte et une minorit6 trop faible, dans les domaines consid6r6s comme d'importance vitale, parce que l'on semble croire, cette 6poque, qu'un tel contact
avec 'autre en ces domaines risquerait de d6truire l'identit6 collective de la minorit6.166

In this way, by confining federal and provincial legislative powers to discrete,

watertight compartments of jurisdiction, Quebec would inhabit a "constitutional
reserve" - a guaranteed political space free from federal interference in which
the cultural survival of the Qu bcois people could be assured:
De la m~me fagon que la collectivit6 qu6bcoise est concentr~e sur un territoire,
de m~me, certains champs de l'activit6 politique lui sont-ils <rdservds >; en d'autres termes, elle est, pour ces67domaines, considdrde comme devant vivre dans une
« r6serve > constitutionelle1

The classical paradigm has thus been clearly and passionately defended by
autonomists such as R6millard, Patenaude, and by Beetz in both his professorial
and judicial capacities. The common theme running through their writings
described above is that the classical approach to exclusivity is necessary to ameliorate the impact of the hierarchical conception of federalism embodied in the
judicially created rule of federal paramountcy. 6 ' If overlapping powers give rise
164Ibid. at 132.
1651bid. at 121.
166Ibid.
at 123.
167
1bid.
168The same concern can be found in the anglophone scholarship (see, e.g., the authors cited in
note 127, supra), but with a different emphasis: it is mentioned not as a rationale for adhering scrupulously to the classical paradigm, but as a reason for exercising caution regarding the application
of the modem paradigm.
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to spheres of hierarchical relations, then an authentic federalism of equals
requires that overlapping powers be eliminated.
While this view is compellingly straightforward, strict adherence to a classical conception of exclusivity does not appear to provide the optimal juridical
strategy for promoting the autonomy of Quebec and the provinces. I will analyze two aspects of the classical paradigm that fail to promote provincial autonomy. First, the judicially created rule prohibiting the inter-delegation of powers
unnecessarily limits the legislative options available to provincial governments.
Secondly, the confinement of provincial heads of power to watertight compartments in order to avoid creating overlapping spheres of competence has the
same effect.
The classical understanding of exclusivity is usually associated with the
rule prohibiting the inter-delegation of legislative powers. The principle of
exclusivity was relied on by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Nova Scotia
Inter-delegation case as one of the reasons why the constitution should not be
interpreted so as to permit legislative inter-delegation. Rinfret C.J. reasoned as
follows:
Neither legislative bodies, federal or provincial, possess any portion of the powers
respectively vested in the other and they cannot receive it by delegation. In that
connection the word "exclusively" used both in section 91 and in section 92 indicates a settled line of demarcation and it does not belong
to either Parliament, or
69
the Legislatures, to confer powers upon the other.'
The judges concluded that in the absence of an express power of interdelegation in the constitution, the two levels of government should not be
allowed to agree to rearrange the mutually exclusive spheres of legislative
authority allotted by the division of powers.

The authority of the Nova Scotia Inter-delegation case has been gradually
eroded over time, to the point that its continuing doctrinal significance is uncertain and its theoretical underpinnings must be re-evaluated. Subsequent decisions allowed legislatures to circumvent the rigidity of the prohibition on legislative inter-delegation by sanctioning the use of devices such as administrative
inter-delegation and anticipatory incorporation by reference. 7 ° Based on these
cases, commentators were able to conclude that
The only vestige of a prohibition against inter-delegation which could now be
argued to remain would be the rule that one legislative body cannot enlarge the
powers of another by authorizing the latter to enact laws which
would have no sig7
nificance and no validity independent of the delegation.' '
169Supra, note 49 at 34-35.
17°Supra, notes 58-59.
171Hogg, supra, note 3 at 307. For similar assessments of the case law, see Patenaude, supra,
note 9 at 230-31; Weiler, supra,note 92 at 316-18; E.A. Driedger, "The Interaction of Federal and
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Even this conclusionhas been placed in doubt by the recent Supreme Court
decision in Dick in which the court stated that there was no constitutional
impediment to the incorporation by reference in the federal IndianAct'72 of provincial legislation that could not otherwise validly apply to "Indians. '17 3 On the
court's interpretation of s. 88 of the IndianAct, the federal government was not
simply recognizing and adopting the exercise of provincial legislation that was

independently valid in all respects; rather it was conferring a power on provincial legislatures that they otherwise lacked: the power to pass legislation touching the "core of Indianness."' 7 4 Previous cases had permitted such a delegation
of power only if it occurred through an administrative intermediary;"'5 no pre-

vious case had permitted the delegation of legislative power directly to the legislative branch of the other level of government.'76 Arguably, the Dick case goes
further than any previous case in undermining the Nova Scotia Inter-delegation
holding.'
However, the Nova Scotia Inter-delegation case has not been overruled.
The Supreme Court continues to pay lip service to the decision while it chips
away at its doctrinal and practical relevance. In the face of this contradictory
doctrinal situation, legislatures are more likely to respond by resorting to the
established methods of evading the decision than to employ a scheme of legislative inter-delegation that would directly challenge the continuing constitutional validity of the Nova Scotia Inter-delegation decision. This raises the
question: are there any good reasons for not explicitly overruling the Nova ScoProvincial Laws" (1976) 54 Can. Bar Rev. 695 at 709; K.M. Lysyk, "The Inter-Delegation Doctrine: A Constitutional Paper Tiger?" (1969) 47 Can. Bar Rev. 271; W.R. Lederman, "Some Forms
and Limitations of Cooperative Federalism" (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 409; G.V. La Forest, "Delegation
of Legislative Power in Canada" (1975) 21 McGill L.J. 131.
172R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5 [hereinafter Indian Act].
173Supra, note 59 at 328, and see discussion below at 370-76.
174Were it not for this interpretation of s. 88, provincial laws that touch on matters at the heart
of native identity would not apply to native people because they would be read down pursuant to
the 75interjurisdictional immunity doctrine.
1 Coughlin, supra, note 58; Willis, supra, note 58; Reference re AgriculturalProductsMarketing76Act, supra, note 58.
1 Hogg argues that the decision in Lord's Day Alliance of Canada v. A.-G. B.C., supra, note
59 did in fact sanction federal legislation that had the effect of enlarging the powers of the provincial
legislatures; see supra, note 3 at 305-307.
77
1 It could be argued against this interpretation of Dick that provincial laws of general application that affect the "core of Indianness" do have independent validity apart from the federal delegation - they can validly apply to non-native provincial residents. The interpretation of s. 88 in
Dick simply leads to the incorporation of valid provincial laws and uses them for federal purposes,
namely the regulation of First Nations peoples' lives pursuant to s. 91(24). Even on this view, the
extension of federal inter-delegation in Dick is overly casual given the differences between s. 88
and the earlier cases, and more importantly, given the distinct constitutional considerations that
ought to guide the interpretation of federal jurisdiction pursuant to s. 91(24). See below at text
accompanying notes 287-89.
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tia Inter-delegation ruling and allowing the open inter-delegation of legislative

powers?
There appear to be two main contentions advanced against permitting legislative inter-delegation. The first is the argument emphasized by the Supreme
Court in the Nova Scotia Inter-delegationcase itself: the various legislative bodies should not be allowed to alter the mutually exclusive spheres of jurisdiction
determined by the constitutional division of powers. On this view, legislative
inter-delegation is an improper substitute for the constitutional amendment procedures in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982:
handing over a plenary and primary legislative discretion in this manner, even on
a bilateral basis subject to revocation, is not really delegation at all, it is amendment of 178
the federal constitution, however partial or temporary such amendment
may be.

As Hogg has pointed out, the analogy to constitutional amendment is
flawed:
A delegation of power does not divest the delegator of its power; nor does it confer
a permanent power on the delegate. The delegator has the continuing power to legislate on the same topic concurrently'
if it chooses, and more important, it can with17
draw the delegation at any time. 9

In order to preserve the integrity of the constitutional division of respon-

sibility, it is necessary that inter-delegation be allowed only upon mutual consent of the legislatures involved, and only if the delegation is revocable by either

party. If consent were not required, there would be no guarantee of debate and
accountability at both levels to the transfer or exchange of power. Similarly, revocability is necessary to ensure ongoing consent and accountability. If these
conditions are satisfied, the delegating legislative body would retain ultimate
responsibility for and control over the exercise of the delegated powers (which
would not, of course, be the case if the powers were transferred by legislative
amendment).' If, for example, the federal government agreed with the Quebec
17SLederman, supra, note 171 at 421.
179Hogg, supra, note 3 at 297.
1800n several instances in which proposals have been considered to amend the constitution to
explicitly permit legislative inter-delegation, the importance of mutual consent and revocability
have been recognized. For example, the Fulton-Favreau proposals of 1964 would have allowed for
legislative inter-delegation upon mutual consent of the legislatures involved, and the delegation
could be revoked at any time by the delegating body. For a discussion, see Lederman, supra, note
171 at 425-26. Similarly, the Ppin-Robarts Report of 1979 recommended that "[a] new constitution should recognize the right of the central and provincial governments to delegate to each other,
by mutual consent, any legislative power..." (emphasis added). Task Force on Canadian Unity, A
Future Together (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1979) at 131. While these proposals
would have overcome the Nova Scotia Inter-delegationdecision by constitutional amendment, the
same result could be achieved by the development of similar judicial doctrines if the Nova Scotia
Inter-delegation case is overruled.
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government to delegate powers over broadcasting to Quebec, the merits of the
initial delegation would be debated in Parliament as well as the National
Assembly. And the ongoing desirability of the delegation of such powers could
be continually challenged by the citizens of Canada and Quebec and their
respective parliamentary and legislative representatives.
As long as the condition of continuing mutual consent is met, legislative
inter-delegation does not change the division of powers, nor does it represent the
abdication of constitutional responsibility by the delegating level of government
over a subject matter within its exclusive jurisdiction; it is merely one way in
which a legislative power may be exercised by the delegating government. 8' On
this view, exclusivity is not compromised because the receiving legislature is
simply acting as the agent of the delegating legislature. If the delegating legislature decides that the delegate is not serving the needs of the public adequately
in the delegated area of jurisdiction, it can revoke the delegation. Indeed, in the
absence of an explicit prohibition on legislative inter-delegation in the constitution, there would appear to be no warrant for qualifying the democratic principle
of exhaustiveness - all possible exercises of legislative power must be within
the authority of one level of government or the other:
The legal powers of the British Parliament being absolutely unlimited and the
Dominion and provincial powers, when acting in concert, being equal to the powers of the British Parliament, how is it possible ... that the power or delegation
inter se does not exist in these bodies? The issue then is simply this: granted that
absolute sovereignty exists in Canadian legislatures, is there anything which can
82
override the natural attribute of this sovereignty to delegate in any way?'

A second argument against inter-delegation is that it blurs jurisdictional
responsibilities and thus renders political accountability more difficult. The
same criticism has been made of the use of the federal spending power in areas
of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. As Trudeau put it:
A fundamental condition of representative democracy is a clear allocation of
responsibilities: a citizen who disapproves of a policy, a law, a municipal by-law,
or an educational system must know precisely whose work it is so that he can hold
someone responsible for it at the next election ... Since the same citizens vote in
both federal and provincial elections, they must be able to determine readily which
for what; otherwise the democratic control of power
government is responsible
83
becomes impossible.'
' 8 'J.B. Ballem, "Constitutional Law - Delegation - Approach of the Supreme Court of Canada to the B.N.A. Act" (1959) 29 Can. Bar. Rev. 79 at 85.
182
Ibid. See also Hogg, supra, note 3 at 297.
183P.E. Trudeau, "Federal Grants to Universities" in Federalism and the French Canadians
(Toronto: MacMillan, 1968) at 79. A similar point is made by Tremblay, supra, note 147 at 92 n.
196, and by Lederman, supra, note 171 at 426 (delegation "could seriously confuse the basic political responsibility and accountability of members of the federal Parliament and the federal Cabinet,
and too much of this could destroy these federal institutions.").
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This is an argument against all forms of inter-delegation and, indeed, against
anything other than a watertight compartments division of powers. The effect of
inter-delegation is to create an area of temporary, concurrent responsibility.
Whenever jurisdiction over a subject matter is concurrent, it will be more difficult for citizens to discern which level of government is responsible for any
particular policy. To the extent that some overlapping of powers is unavoidable
in a federal state, the political accountability argument is an argument against
federalism itself.
Like Trudeau, Petter argues that blurring of jurisdictional responsibilities
threatens the political accountability that forms the basis of responsible govemment. Petter adds a further objection - the interspersion of political responsibility has the effect of fragmenting democratic energies: "[t]he result is to
require those advocating a particular reform to fight a battle on two fronts.""'
However, delegation, and more generally the creation of areas of overlapping responsibility, has both advantages and disadvantages from a democratic
point of view. One can question the severity of the problems identified by Trudeau and Petter: there is little empirical evidence to suggest that citizens are
confused or politically disempowered, for example, by the existence of concurrent federal and provincial powers over agriculture, immigration and pensions,
nor that such effects occur in areas of judicially-created concurrency, such as the
regulation of highway traffic. While concurrency does blur bright lines of
accountability, it also creates the possibility of a heightened, dual accountability.
The dissatisfied citizen may know very well that she or he can turn to either
level of government to seek reform. While it is true that intermingling of
responsibilities blurs accountability and heightens opportunities for government
buck-passing, it also furthers desirable intergovernmental competition and creates "multiple access points" for citizens seeking reform. Democratic criteria, in
other words, cut both ways in evaluating the desirability of delegation or concurrency. In Simeon's words:
Democratic criteria can evaluate very differently the advantages and disadvantages of overlapping responsibilities - either frustrating citizens185 by their complexity, or advantaging them by offering multiple access points.
In sum, the arguments in support of the position that inter-delegation violates federal and democratic principles are not persuasive. Rather, the rule prohibiting legislative inter-delegation is an unwarranted interference with "such
basic constitutional principles as the ... doctrine of plenary and ample power and
184A. Petter, "Meech Ado About Nothing? Federalism, Democracy and the Spending Power" in
K.E. Swinton & C.J. Rogerson, eds, Competing Constitutional Visions: The Meech Lake Accord
(Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 187 at 192. See also A. Petter, "The Myth of the Federal Spending
Power"
(1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 448.
185Simeon, supra, note 38 at 152.
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its associated doctrine that the totality of legislative power is distributed to
Canadian legislative bodies."' 6 Although inter-delegation of powers is not permitted on a classical understanding of exclusivity, it would enhance provincial
autonomy by significantly enlarging the potential political space available to the
provinces. So long as ongoing mutual consent is a precondition to any valid delegation of power, constitutional flexibility can be obtained with no loss of constitutional responsibility.
The second aspect of the classical paradigm that fails to promote provincial
autonomy is the insistence on confining provincial and federal powers alike to
discrete boxes of jurisdiction in order to avoid areas of concurrency. As the classical autonomists are right to emphasize, areas of overlapping powers create
political spaces in which the provinces are subordinate to the federal government. Nevertheless, from the point of view of provincial autonomy, the occupation of a subordinate space is better than no occupation whatsoever. To the
extent that the classical paradigm confines provincial powers as well as federal
powers to strictly defined watertight compartments of jurisdiction, provincial
autonomy is compromised. Clearly there is real danger in allowing the imperial
tendencies of federal jurisdiction to spread over provincial areas of jurisdiction.
R6millard's emphasis on the hierarchy entailed in overlap is a useful image
here: the expansion of supreme federal jurisdiction over top of provincial
spheres of jurisdiction would suffocate provincial autonomy. There is no such
danger involved in allowing provincial areas of jurisdiction to extend under federal areas of jurisdiction. From the point of view of provincial autonomy, overlap (or, perhaps more accurately, "underlap") in such contexts is far preferable
to no provincial role at all.
Jacques-Yvan Morin captured the heart of the matter when, in discussing
the relationship of the range of the penumbral "zones grises" at the edges of federal and provincial spheres of jurisdiction to provincial autonomy, he stated "I1
reste en effet a savoir si la p6nombre s'6tendra sur les comp6tences provinciales
ou sur les pouvoirs f~deraux. ' s
Only the former type of overlap - the extension of the penumbra of federal
jurisdiction over areas reserved to the provinces - is a threat to provincial
autonomy. Thus, according weight to the value of provincial autonomy in the
interpretation of the division of powers suggests that the doctrinal features of the
classical paradigm should be invoked in defining the scope of federal jurisdiction and those of the modem paradigm in defining the scope of provincial jurisdiction."'
6
1 Hogg, supra, note 3 at 297.

Morin, "Vers un nouvel dquilibre constitutionnel au Canada" in Cr6peau & Macpherson,
I87j._y.
eds, supra, note 43, 141 at 144.
8
1gThe
generality of these propositions will be altered in Part IV to take into account the equally

valid constitutional claim to autonomy of First Nations people.
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On this analysis, the doctrinal structure of Canadian federalism has only
imperfectly promoted provincial autonomy. A good example is the manner in
which the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine has been applied by the courts.
The vast majority of the cases define core areas of federaljurisdiction that are
immune from the application of otherwise valid provincial laws. This doctrinal
approach originated with the federally incorporated company cases, and has
since been applied to federal undertakings (such as Bell Canada), the postal service, the armed forces, the R.C.M.P., federal elections and "Indians and lands
reserved for the Indians."' 89 As I will argue in the next section, the application
of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to legislation affecting First Nations
people is justifiable, as their distinct constitutional status gives rise to a special
claim to autonomy. Otherwise, there is no justification for invoking interjurisdictional immunity to read down provincial statutes in the name of protecting
an exclusive core of federal jurisdiction. The exclusivity of federal jurisdiction
is adequately protected by the modem paradigm: if provincial statutes have
spillover effects on a federal area of jurisdiction, the federal government has the
constitutional powers to protect itself. It has the exclusive ability to pass laws
that in pith and substance deal with a federal subject matter, and the rule of federal paramountcy will ensure that a federal law will prevail over any inconsistent provincial law. 9

Where the pith and substance of a provincial law is a subject matter allocated to exclusive provincial competence, reading down the law to protect federal areas of jurisdiction unnecessarily restricts the scope of provincial powers
and thus of provincial autonomy. For this reason, the Bell 1966 case was heavily
criticized in Quebec. 9' Rather than applying the doctrinal features of the clas189See supra, note 114. Useful summaries of these cases can be found in Elliott, supra, note 45
at 523, n. 1; Finkelstein, supra, note 127 at 525-31. The application of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine was recently extended to a new subject matter, that of federally established transportation services operating within a province on federal lands: Commission de transportde la communautg urbainede Quebec v. Canada (NationalBattlefields Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 838,
74 D.L.R. (4th) 23.

190Hogg, supra, note 3 at 329-32.
191G. L'cuyer, La coursupreme du Canadaet le partagedes compdtences 1949-1978 (Quebec:
Minist~re des Affaires intergouvernementales, 1978) at 239 (after criticizing the court's conclusion
in Bell 1966 that the Quebec minimum wage law could not apply to a federal undertaking even
in the absence of a federal law, he commented that "[o]n peut s'interroger sur le nombre de r~glementations provinciales qui seront rendus ainsi rendues inapplicables aux entreprises dejuridiction
fddrale."); J.-C. Bonenfant, "La cour supreme et le partage des comprtences" (1976) 14 Alta. L.
Rev. 21 at 28 (Bell 1966 "favorisa la th~se f~drrale, elle fut vertement critiqude dans le Quebec.");
R. Chaput, "La cour supreme et le partage des pouvoirs: Retrospectives et inventaires" (1981) 12
R.G.D. 35 at 69-70 ("Les autonomistes ...
regretteront que Ia Cour supreme ait utilis6 la fissure causde par Sir Lyman Duff dans le renvoi de 1925 sur la legislation concemant les heures de travail
pour op~rer graduellement une brche importante dans la juridiction des provinces en matibre de
Travail ... "). See also P. Blache, "La doctrine du champ inoccup6 se porte-t-elle mal?" (1967) 2
R.J.T. 39.
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sical paradigm to provincial statutes, provincial autonomy is best promoted by
giving a liberal application to the pith and substance doctrine when considering
provincial statutes and by taking a restrained approach to paramountcy.
The importance of applying these elements of the modem paradigm to provincial statutes is well illustrated in recent Supreme Court decisions dealing
with jurisdiction over broadcasting. The importance to Quebec of some ability
to shape communications policy is described by Rdmillard:
I1est donc capital pour le Quebec d'avoir les comprtences nrcessaires pour 6tablir
sur son territoire la politique des communications 9qui lui convient, en fonction de
son identit6 et de ses responsabilits culturelles.1
As the Privy Council and the Supreme Court have held that the regulation of
radio and television broadcasting falls within federal jurisdiction,'93 a strict
application of the classical paradigm would leave very limited scope for the
application of provincial legislation dealing in pith and substance with matters
within provincial jurisdiction - such as education, or the use of the french language at workplaces within the province - to federal broadcast undertakings.
In A.G. Quebec v. Kellogg's of Canada94 and Iwin Toy Ltd. v. A.G. Quebec, ' the Supreme Court upheld Quebec laws regulating advertising directed
at children. In both cases, advertisers argued that the Quebec government lacked
the power to regulate television advertising. In Kellogg's, Martland J. for the
majority of the court held that the pith and substance of the law was the regulation of business activity in the province and its effect on a television broadcast
undertaking was a merely incidental one. Laskin J., in dissent, took the classical
approach, holding that the provincial law could not validly apply to a broadcast
undertaking within exclusive federal jurisdiction.
9

The reasoning of Martland J. for the majority in Kellogg's was affirmed by
the court in Ihwin Toy: the legislation prohibiting advertising directed at children
simply had an incidental affect on television undertakings. On the other hand,
if a provincial law touched on "essential and vital elements" of a federal undertaking, or if it had the effect of impairing the operation of a federal undertaking,
it could not constitutionally apply. In this way, the court also affirmed the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine applied in Bell 1988 and other cases. While the
results in Kellogg's and Ii-win Toy were desirable, the continued affirmation of
the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is an unfortunate limitation on provincial autonomy. A preferable approach would be to allow a provincial law to
192R6millard, Le fidralisme canadien, supra, note 149 at 474.
193Re Regulation & Control of Radio Communication (Radio Reference), [1932] A.C. 304, 2
D.L.R. 81 (P.C.); Capital Cities Communications v. C.R.T.C., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, 81 D.L.R. (3d)
609; Public Service Board v. Dionne, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 191, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 178.
194[1978] 2 S.C.R. 211, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 314 [hereinafter Kellogg's cited to S.C.R.].
195[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [hereinafter Irwin Toy cited to S.C.R.].
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apply to federal undertakings, whether or not the law touches upon essential or
vital elements of the undertaking, so long as the law is in pith and substance
within a provincial head of jurisdiction, and the effects on federal jurisdiction
are merely incidental. If the federal government does not agree with the provincial policy as applied to a federal undertaking, it can pass its own legislation to
render inoperative the application of the provincial law to the federal undertaking.196

The positive aspect of the Kellogg's and Irwin Toy decisions is their liberal
application of the pith and substance doctrines to allow provincial jurisdiction
to extend "under" federal jurisdiction over broadcasting. In so doing, they
expand the scope of provincial autonomy without compromising ultimate federal control of broadcasting policy. In order for this extension of provincial
jurisdiction to be meaningful, the court must also take a restrained approach to
paramountcy. Otherwise, the "underlapping" provincial legislation will be rendered inoperative by any federal broadcasting legislation that covers the field.
An argument was made to the court in Irwin Toy that by inserting conditions relating to children's advertising in a broadcaster's licence, the federal
government had occupied the field and rendered inoperative any provincial law
purporting to regulate the same subject matter. This argument was rejected on
the grounds that there was no "practical and functional incompatibility"
between the provisions of the federal licence and the Quebec regulatory scheme.
In the words of the majority judges:
Neither television broadcasters nor advertisers are put into a position of defying
one set of standards by complying with the other. If each group complies with the
standards applicable to it, no conflict between the standards ever arises. It is only
if advertisers seek to comply with the lower threshold applicable to television
broadcasters that a conflict arises. Absent an attempt by the federal government to
make that lower standard the sole governing
standard, there is no occasion to
97
invoke the doctrine of paramountcy'
The importance to provincial autonomy of such a limited role for the doctrine of paramountcy cannot be overemphasized. As R6millard explains:
le fdd6ralisme canadien est bas6 en tr~s grande partie sur un partage de comp6tences concurrentes, d'oi l'immense importance du principe de ]a pr6pond6rance
98
dont l'application s'6tend aussi Atoute comp6tence concurrente
fdd6rale ...

Since the modem approach allows "underlapping" provincial legislation to
operate by giving a very narrow scope to the paramountcy doctrine, "il faut dire
que c'est tr~s heureux pour le respect du principe f6d6ratif."' Commenting on
196Hogg, supra, note 3 at 328-32.
197
Supra, note 195 at 964.
98

1 R~millard, Le fidralisme canadien, supra, note 149 at 300.
'91bid. at 303.
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the Supreme Court's clear articulation of the modem approach to paramountcy
in Multiple Access, Rdmillard states:
I1s'agit certainement IAd'un des jugements les plus provincialistes de la Cour
supreme canadienne. En r6duisant aussi la portde de la notion de conflit on peut
penser qu'il est encore possible pour les provinces de conserver leur autonomie
malgr6 la multiplication des compdtences concurrentes. 2°

Any departure from the modem, express conflict approach to paramountcy
is thus a blow to the federal principle. In this sense, the recent Supreme Court
decision in Bank of Montreal v. Hall"' is cause for concern. The issue in the
case was whether the procedural requirements imposed by the Saskatchewan
Limitation of Civil Rights Act 2 2 for the seizure of security interests could apply
to a security interest created under the federal Bank Act.2' 3 La Forest J. recognized that the regulation of bank security interests was a double aspect matter
- both the federal and provincial laws could validly apply to the facts at hand:
there can be no hermetic division between banking as a generic activity and the
of
domain covered by property and civil rights. A spillover effect in the operation
24

banking legislation on the general law of the provinces is inevitable. 0

However, after upholding the validity of the two overlapping Acts, La Forest J.
then held that the provincial law was rendered inoperative by virtue of federal
paramountcy. He reached this result notwithstanding that the challenged provision of the Saskatchewan Limitation of Civil Rights Act simply required a creditor to give notice to a debtor prior to the seizing of a security interest. As the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal noted in its decision upholding the application
of the provincial Act, the effect of applying the provision would be to require
"the Bank to follow certain procedures before realizing upon its security, and
nothing more."2 5 Presumably, it was important to the Saskatchewan legislature
that debtors - including farmers like the defendant Hall whose machinery had
been seized - be accorded certain rights before having their means of earning
a livelihood interfered with.
La Forest J. cited the modem approach to paramountcy, namely, that provincial legislation will be rendered inoperative only in the case of express conflict, in the sense that compliance with both statutes is impossible. Nevertheless,
La Forest J.'s reasons make clear that his conception of this test entails a "negative implication" approach to paramountcy:
2
°°Rdmillard, "Des diffdrentes espices de comp6tences ldgislatives et de leurs grands principes
d'interprdtation," supra, note 149 at 688.
201[1990] 1 S.C.R. 121, 65 D.L.R. (4th) 361 [hereinafter Hall cited to S.C.R.].
202
R.S.S. 1978, c. L-16.
203
R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1.
2
04Supra, note 201 at 145.
2
°5Bank of Montreal v. Hall (1987), 54 Sask. R. 30 at 40, 36 D.L.R. (4th) 523, rev'd, ibid.,
quoted in supra at 153.
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dual compliance will be impossible when application of the provincial statute can
fairly be said to frustrate Parliament's legislative purpose ... it was Parliament's
manifest legislative purpose that the sole realization scheme applicable to the s.
178 security interest be that contained in the Bank Act itself ... the determination
that there is no repugnancy cannot be made to rest on the sole consideration that,
at the end of the day, the bank might very well be able to realize on its security
if it defers to the provisions of the provincial legislation. A showing that conflict
can be avoided if a provincial Act is followed to the exclusion of a federal Act can
hardly be determinative of the question whether the provincial and federal Acts are
in conflict, and, hence, repugnant ... The focus of the inquiry, rather, must be on
the broader question whether operation of the provincial Act is compatible with
the federal legislative purpose. Absent this compatibility, dual compliance is
impossible. Such is the case here. The two statutes differ to such a degree in the
approach taken to the problem of realization that the provincial cannot substitute
for the federal. 2°

The contrast to cases like Irwin Toy and Multiple Access could not be more
clear. In those cases, the court refused to read a negative implication into federal

legislation that the application of valid provincial legislation was to be
excluded. If the federal government wants its legislation to be the sole applicable law, it can say so explicitly.2' Even though there was no such declaration

in the Bank Act, La Forest J. stated that it constitutes
a complete code that at once defines and provides for the realization of a security
interest. There is no room left for the operation of the provincial legislation and
that legislation should, accordingly, be construed20as
inapplicable to the extent that
8
it trenches on valid federal banking legislation.

In other words, where Parliament has covered the field by enacting a complete
code of regulation, valid provincial legislation will be rendered inoperative by
the paramountcy doctrine.
The departure from the modem approach to paramountcy (in deed if not in

word) in Hall is an unfortunate development from the point of view of provincial autonomy. The invocation of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to
read down provincial statutes in cases like Bell 1988 is even more troubling.
The interjurisdictional immunity doctrine represents, in effect, a more radical
conception of paramountcy than the classical "covering the field" approach. The
result of applying the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is the practical equi2
06Ibid. at
2

154-5.
07Even then, there is a strong argument that such a declaration would be of no force and effect.
The protection of provincial autonomy requires that the express conflict rule of paramountcy be
treated as a constitutional principle beyond the ability of the federal government to unilaterally
alter. See Beetz J.'s suggestion to this effect in Dick, supra, note 59 at 327. Again, the generality
of this argument must be qualified regarding s. 91(24) in light of the distinct constitutional status
of the First Nations: the federal or the First Nations governments must have the power to specify
a broad approach to paramountcy (as the federal government has in s. 88 of the Indian Act) in order
to afford native people protection from the application of provincial laws.
208
Supra, note 201 at 155.
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valent of an "uncovered field" rule of paramountcy in matters at the core of federal areas of jurisdiction. Even if the federal government has not legislated, the
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine requires that provincial legislation be read
down so as not to apply in those areas. In this sense, the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine is the polar extreme of the constitutional value embodied in
the restrained, express conflict approach to paramountcy. In adopting this
approach in Bell 1988, Beetz J. stated that criticisms of the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine rested on "a spirit of contradiction between systems of regulation." 2' In contrast, the modem paradigm applied in cases like Multiple
Access allows for overlapping responsibilities, and rather than seeing in such
overlap a "spirit of contradiction," finds the duplication of laws to be the "ulti'
mate in harmony."21

When it comes to determining the scope of provincial jurisdiction, the
modem paradigm is to be preferred to the classical approach embodied in La
Forest J.'s judgment in Hall and Beetz J.'s judgment in Bell 1988. The modem
paradigm has the advantage of maximising the legislative space accorded to
provincial governments in which, in Pigeon's words, they can exercise their
right of being different by defining their own policies.211 The classical paradigm
does have the advantage of eliminating the administrative complexity and
"spirit of contradiction" that comes with overlapping spheres of legislative
jurisdiction. When considering the scope of provincial jurisdiction, the modem
paradigm has on its side a constitutional value of the highest order: the promotion of provincial autonomy. On the other hand, whether a social problem is better regulated by one law or two is a question that is better left to be worked out
by the legislative and executive branches of government. As Hogg has stated,
The argument that it is untidy, wasteful and confusing to have two laws when only
one is needed reflects a value which in
2 12a federal system often has to be subordinated to that of provincial autonomy.
On the other hand, the classical paradigm has an important role to play in

confining the scope of federal jurisdiction in order to preserve provincial autonomy. It is in this context that classical techniques that would limit the degree to

which federal legislation overlaps with provincial areas of jurisdiction have a
legitimate constitutional role to play. However, there are very few instances in
which federal legislation has been read down to protect areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.2" 3 This is especially true relative to the plethora of cases
2
°gSupra, note
21

42 at 843.
°Supra, notes 54-56.
Supra, notes 139-40.
212
Supra, note 3 at 364.
213
Hogg states that "[a] case could be made for some degree of immunity for provincially21

regulated undertakings from federal law, on the ground that the provinces cannot protect their
undertakings from federal law..." (ibid. at 331). He then notes that "[t]here is no case applying the
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invoking interjurisdictional immunity to preserve the exclusivity of federal
jurisdiction. The promotion of provincial autonomy requires that this pattern of
results be reversed.
As always, the interpretive goal should be to preserve provincial autonomy
without compromising federal autonomy or the democratic principle of exhaustiveness. Provincial autonomy is best preserved by reducing as much as possible
the scope of overlapping federal legislation. The courts should thus take a
restrictive approach to federal legislation that overlaps with provincial areas of
jurisdiction; and a liberal approach to provincial legislation that "underlaps"
with federal areas of jurisdiction. If the pith and substance of a provincial law
is a matter within provincial jurisdiction, it should be upheld even if its provisions have an "incidental" effect on a federal area of jurisdiction, so long as the
provisions having an incidental effect are rationally or functionally related to the
provincial legislative scheme as a whole. On the other hand, where provisions
of valid federal legislation have spillover effects on a provincial area of jurisdiction, they should be upheld only if those incidental effects are "truly necessary" to the effective accomplishment of the valid federal objective." 4
This analysis challenges the existing case law. For example, Dickson C.J.
recently commented that:
doctrine in favour of provincially-incorporated companies, or provincial instrumentalities..."
(supraat 331, n.112). Elliott argues that it may be an overstatement to say there are no such cases;
he cites a number of examples of cases in which federal legislation has been read down to preserve
the exclusivity of provincial jurisdiction. Supra, note 45 at 542 (citing Jabour v. Law Society of
British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, [1981] 2 W.W.R. 159; Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v.
CanadianPacific Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054, 9 N.R. 417; Ref. re Validity of Industrial Relations
and Disputes Investigation Act, [1955] S.C.R. 529, 3 D.L.R. 721). See also Clark v. Canadian
NationalRailway Co., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 58 [hereinafter Clark cited to S.C.R.].
However, in most of these cases, federal statutes have been read down because their spillover
effects on provincial areas of jurisdiction have not been found to be "necessarily incidental" to the
federal legislative scheme. If interjurisdictional immunity had been explicitly invoked - if the
courts had defined core areas of provincial jurisdiction immune from the application of any overlapping valid federal legislation (which they have not) - provincial jurisdiction would be absolutely exclusive even if a federal intrusion was necessarily incidental to the federal legislative
scheme.
214
This analysis is similar to that of Dickson C.J. in GeneralMotors, supra, note 37 at 670-71,
in that he too recognizes a series of appropriate tests for determining the validity of provisions having an incidental effect on the other government's jurisdiction, ranging from the less demanding
"rational and functional connection" test, to the more severe "truly necessary" test. On Dickson
C.J.'s analysis, the more restrictive tests will be appropriate the more serious the encroachment on
provincial or federal power.
The difference in my analysis is that I am suggesting that encroachments on provincial power
by the federal government are always more severe, and that encroachments on federal power by
provincial governments are not nearly so serious from the point of view of the federal principle.
Thus, unlike Dickson C.J., I am suggesting that the most severe test be consistently applied to
encroaching federal legislation, and that the most tolerant test be consistently applied to encroaching provincial legislation.
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it should be remembered that in a federal system it is inevitable that, in pursuing
valid objectives, the legislation of each level of government will impact occasionally on the sphere of power of the other level of government; overlap of legislation
is to be expected and accommodated in a federal state. Thus a certain degree of
judicial restraint in proposing strict tests which will result in striking down such
legislation is appropriate. I s

In making this comment, Dickson C.J. made no distinction between federal and

provincial laws. Rather, he made it clear that he believed there should be symmetry in the application of constitutional principles of interpretation to federal
and provincial laws:
Both provincial and federal governments have equal ability to legislate
216 in ways
that may incidentally affect the other government's sphere of power.

While Dickson C.J.'s "restrained" approach to "underlapping" provincial
legislation is laudable, it should not be applied to overlapping federal legislation. The promotion of provincial autonomy requires that an asymmetrical
approach be adopted, one that is not tolerant of federal incursions on provincial
spheres of power. Such asymmetry may at first blush strike a discordant note
with the conventional wisdom. It is however a principled counterbalance to the
threat to an authentic federalism posed by the hierarchical relations created by
federal paramountcy in areas of concurrent jurisdiction. A symmetrical
approach ignores the fact that the federal paramountcy rule places the provincial
and federal governments in very different positions in terms of their ability to
preserve their respective autonomies.
At the same time, valid federal powers are rendered nugatory if overlap is
prohibited even when such overlap is necessary to the effective exercise of federal powers. For this reason, the goal of eliminating all federal overlapping legislation in the name of provincial autonomy must give way to a limited extent
to accommodate the democratic principle of exhaustiveness. Federal legislation
should be read down so as not to interfere with provincial jurisdiction unless the
overlapping federal provisions are necessarily incidental to the federal
scheme.217 A good recent example of federal legislation being read down in this
215

1bid. at 669.
1bid. at 670. Dickson C.J. quoted the following passage from Professor Hogg's textbook
(supra, note 3 at 336): "I think it is plain both on principle and on authority that the provincial enumerated powers have exactly the same capacity as the federal enumerated powers to 'affect' matters217allocated to the other level of government."
Rrmillard recognizes the importance of confining the scope of the "ancillary powers" doctrine
to necessarily incidental provisions: "Le pouvoir implicite a done des consequences importantes
sur le partage des comprtences l6gislatives lorsqu'il est reli6 au pouvoir prpondrrant du Parlement
canadien." Lefidgralisme canadien,supra, note 149 at 297. For this reason, any overlap must be
"nrcessairement complmentaire d'une competence exclusive." Ibid. at 297-98. Again, the only
difference between Rrmillard's analysis and my own is that I am suggesting that this restrictive
approach be applied only to federal legislation.
216
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way is the Supreme Court decision in Clark. The issue in the case was whether
the more restrictive limitations period in the federal Railway Act" 8 or the limitations period in the New Brunswick Limitations of Actions Act2.9 should apply
to the bringing of a negligence action by a child seriously injured in a railway
accident. The court held that a limitation period relating to an action for personal injury caused by a railway is not an integral part of federal jurisdiction,220
and as a result, the federal provision had to be read down so that it did not apply
to a common law negligence action." In this way, the federal government was
prevented from interfering with exclusive provincial jurisdiction over civil procedure and rights of action for damages for personal injury. On my analysis, this
result should follow in any case where it cannot be said that an interference with
provincial jurisdiction is necessarily incidental to valid federal legislation.
In a related manner, the principle of exhaustiveness is compromised if subject matters that are beyond the competence of the provinces to deal with effectively are also denied to federal jurisdiction. The effect of such a line of reasoning is to create a jurisdictional vacuum. Indeed, the Privy Council decisions in
the Haldane era, by refusing to give any scope to the national dimensions branch
of the federal p.o.g.g. power or to the federal power to pass laws dealing with
the "general regulation of trade throughout the Dominion," had this effect. It is
true that these heads of power must be applied with great caution, for they have
virtually unlimited potential to lift matters out of provincial jurisdiction into the
realm of federal competence. As Beetz J. argued in his influential dissent in the
Anti-Inflation Reference, giving a liberal interpretation to the p.o.g.g. power
would "embrace and smother provincial powers and destroy the equilibrium of
the Constitution. ' '2' However, the national dimensions branch of p.o.g.g., like
the general trade and commerce power, is a power "which if properly understood and properly constrained does not erode local autonomy but rather complements it." The key to "properly" constraining these powers is to limit their
exercise to those instances where the "provincial inability" test is satisfied. This
test is satisfied if the provinces acting alone or in conjunction would lack the
constitutional powers to pass the scheme, or where there
is a need for one national law which cannot realistically be satisfied by cooperative
provincial action because the failure of one province to cooperate
would carry
24
with it grave consequences for the residents of other provinces.2
218
R.S.C.
219

1970, c. R-2, s. 342(1).
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. L-8, s. 18.
220 Supra, note 213 at 708-709.
221
1bid. at 710.
222
Supra, note 37 at 458.
223Dickson J. (as he then was) in A.G. Canada v. C.N. Transportation,[1983] 2 S.C.R. 206 at
278,
2243 D.L.R. (4th) 16.
Hogg, supra, note 3 at 380.
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If this test is applied as a precondition to the valid reliance on the p.o.g.g. and

general trade and commerce powers, then those powers do not threaten provincial autonomy. Rather, they prevent the creation of a gap in the distribution of
legislative powers; the democratic principle of exhaustiveness requires that
there be no areas in which neither the federal nor the provincial government can
constitutionally legislate.
The two most recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the national dimensions branch of p.o.g.g. and the general trade and commerce power, respectively, properly place a great deal of emphasis on the provincial inability test.
In Crown Zellerbach, Le Dain J. adopted the criteria developed by Beetz J. in
the Anti-Inflation Reference for determining whether a matter can be allocated

to the national dimensions branch of p.o.g.g.:
For a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern ... it must have a singleness,
distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern and a scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable
with the fundamental distribution of legislative power under the Constitution ...225
In order to possess these threshold characteristics, the matter must satisfy the
provincial inability test. Before allocating a subject matter to the national

dimensions branch of p.o.g.g, a court must find
that provincial failure to deal effectively with the intra-provincial aspects of the
matter could have an adverse effect on extra-provincial interests. In this sense, the
"provincial inability" test is one of the indicia for determining whether a matter
has that character of singleness or indivisibility required to bring it within the
national concern doctrine. It is because of the interrelatedness of the intraprovincial and extra-provincial
2 26 aspects of the matter that it requires a single or uniform legislative treatment.
Similarly, in General Motors the Supreme Court made clear that a matter
can be allocated to the federal general power over trade and commerce only if
the provincial inability test is satisfied. Two of the criteria articulated by the
court for determining whether federal legislation is a valid exercise of the general trade and commerce power are relevant here:
(i) the legislation should be of a nature that the provinces jointly or severally
would be constitutionally incapable of enacting; and (ii) the failure to include one
or more provinces or localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of the scheme in other parts of the country. These two criteria
... serve to ensure that federal legislation does
227 not upset the balance of power
between federal and provincial governments.
22-Supra, note 37 at 432.

2276lbid. at 434.
22Supra, note 37 at 662.
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In summary, attention to the constitutional primacy of the value of provincial autonomy has significant implications for restructuring the application of
the interpretive doctrines of Canadian federalism. I have attempted to sketch an
approach that would promote provincial autonomy to a much greater degree
than would the thoroughgoing application of the classical paradigm advocated
by Beetz J. in Bell 1988. The classical paradigm preserves an imperfect measure
of provincial autonomy by confining the operations of the federal government
and the provinces alike to discrete, watertight compartments of jurisdiction.
Provincial autonomy is not advanced by doctrines, such as interjurisdictional
immunity, that place limitations on the scope of the operation of provincial statutes within the province. On the other hand, the application of the modem
approach to the pith and substance doctrine will increase the scope of operation
of provincial statutes and thus enhance provincial autonomy. In addition, it is
crucial that the modem approach to the paramountcy doctrine be applied. In
other words, paramountcy should have a restricted role such that provincial legislation is superseded only in the rare cases of express conflict or demonstrated
functional incompatibility. The courts should take a much less tolerant stance
regarding federal legislation that intrudes on provincial areas of jurisdiction.
Such legislation should be read down unless the spillover effects on the provincial area of jurisdiction are absolutely necessary to the attainment of the valid
federal objective, or if the legislation is necessary to respond to a problem of
national scope that the provinces acting alone or in concert are constitutionally
incapable of addressing.
IV. The Paradigms and First Nations Autonomy
The distinct constitutional status of First Nations people is recognized in
section 91(24) of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, which gives to the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to pass laws dealing with "Indians and lands
reserved for Indians." The special constitutional status of the original inhabitants of British North America was also recognized by the process of treatymaking that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 sanctioned as the sole means of
extinguishing aboriginal title. Prior to the enactment of the Constitution Act,
1867, the First Nations did not consent to nor did they participate in any alteration of their special, horizontal relationship to the Crown. Moreover, the Constitution Act, 1867 adopted the federal principle as the best means of preserving
and respecting cultural differences within the newly formed Canadian state. By
guaranteeing political spaces to the founding cultural groups in which they
could define their own policies and preserve their institutions, the constitution
sought to respect the right to cultural difference. These elements of Canadian
constitutional history provide the foundations for an autonomist interpretation
of the meaning of federal jurisdiction over "Indians and lands reserved for Indians." Respecting the distinct constitutional and cultural status of First Nations
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people requires that they be accorded political autonomy in the definition of
their collective and individual destinies.
On this approach, the federal government and the judiciary have an obligation to ensure the autonomy of First Nations governments. Federal laws
affecting "Indians and lands reserved for Indians" should be valid only if they
are passed with the consent of the First Nations people affected.2" Such an
approach would involve a radical shift from the prevailing judicial view that s.
91(24) confers on the federal government plenary authority to enact any and all
laws that in pith and substance are aimed at regulating "Indians" and "Indian
lands." It would also involve a radical departure from the manner in which the
federal government has exercised its powers under s. 91(24).
Whether or not such a conception of the meaning of s. 91(24) to the exercise of federal power is adopted, the autonomy of First Nations people can be
significantly expanded within existing constitutional arrangements by using the
doctrinal techniques of the classical paradigm to limit the scope of application
of provincial laws to "Indians and lands reserved for Indians." In this part I will
focus on three doctrinal features of the classical paradigm that should be
employed to promote autonomy for First Nations people. First, the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine should be used to prevent provincial laws from applying on reserves and from applying off reserves to matters that touch the heart
of First Nations peoples' identities. Second, the broad, classical approach to paramountcy should be applied to prevent provincial laws from applying in areas
where federal laws or laws passed by First Nations governments have "covered
the field." Finally, the classical prohibition on federal inter-delegation should be
invoked to prevent the delegation of federal power in relation to "Indians" and
"Indian lands" to the provinces, unless the consent of the three levels of government involved is obtained. The federal government should not be able to delegate its special constitutional responsibilities regarding First Nations people to
the provinces without the consent of the First Nations themselves.
It is an understatement to say that the existing case law does not follow
these autonomist prescriptions. With few exceptions, the courts have turned
away from employing standard methods of constitutional interpretation in a
manner that would promote the autonomy of First Nations people. Indeed, a
reader unfamiliar with Canadian constitutional and political history could be
forgiven for coming away from the case law with no understanding of the constitutional significance of autonomy and self-government to Canada's original
inhabitants. If provincial autonomy is a value frequently cited in, although
imperfectly promoted by, existing Canadian constitutional doctrine, autonomy
for First Nations people is a hidden constitutional value whose injection into
interpretive practices is long overdue.
228Maklem, supra, note 26.
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For the most part, the courts have applied the modem paradigm to the
interpretation of s. 91(24). As a result, First Nations people have been subjected
to the concurrent, overlapping authority of federal and provincial governments
to an even greater extent than have non-native residents of Canada. Sanders
summarizes the case law as follows:
"Indians" fall into a "double aspect" area in which provincial laws will always
apply in the absence
of special federal legislation. No case states this proposition
229
quite this bluntly.

While no case states forthrightly that the regulation of "Indians" is a double
aspect matter, the case law as a whole has produced "[t]he general rule ...
that
provincial laws apply to Indians and lands reserved for the Indians.""0 For
example, in R. v. Hill,"3 the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the conviction of
a native man for unlawfully practising medicine in contravention of provincial
legislation. One of the reasons the court gave for embracing the modem paradigm revealed the paternalistic attitudes that often surface in the literature

defending the subjection of First Nations people to concurrent provincial and
federal jurisdiction: the court refused to grant First Nations people immunity
from provincial laws for that would leave them to "the condition and rights of
their ancestors when this country was first discovered. ' 2 Similarly, in R. v.
Martin, 3 the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the conviction of a native man for
violating The Ontario Temperance Act,' even though the Indian Act contained
similar provisions regarding the possession of liquor:
no statute of the Provincial Legislature dealing with Indians or their lands as such
would be valid and
235 effective; but there is no reason why general legislation may
not affect them.

These cases and others enabled provincial legislation to apply to First Nations
people so long as the pith and substance of the legislation was a subject matter
within provincial jurisdiction. In a landmark 1967 article, Kenneth Lysyk was
able to conclude that
where Parliament has not legislated ...
the provinces have a relatively free hand in

legislating for the well-being of the Indian ...The area of constitutional flexibility
is in fact very great ...
there is little justification for the reluctance not infrequently
expressed by provincial governments to undertake the same responsibility for
229D.Sanders, "The Application of Provincial Laws" in B.W. Morse, ed., Aboriginal Peoples
and the Law: Indian,Metis and Inuit Rights in Canada(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1984)
452 at 453.
23°Hogg, supra note 3 at 557.
231(1907), 15 O.L.R. 406 (C.A.).
232
1bid, at 411.
?3(1 917), 39 D.L.R. 635, 41 O.L.R. 79 (Ont. C.A.) [cited to D.L.R.J.
23S.O.
1916, c. 50.
235 Supra, note 233 at 639.
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governameliorating the conditions of Indians and Indian settlements that these
236
ments would assume for non-Indians and non-Indian communities.
This situation can be turned around by drawing on the elements of the clas-

sical paradigm in Canadian federalism. The goal is not to preclude the provinces
from playing a substantial role in promoting the well-being of native communities - the provinces have an important role to play in transferring the land
and resources to First Nations necessary to resolve land claims and provide a

secure financial basis to meaningful First Nations governments. However, by
employing the classical paradigm, the application of provincial legislation to
First Nations people would be limited, and greater political space would be
opened up for the First Nations themselves to define their difference and to
develop the policies they deem necessary to guide their communities into the
future.
The autonomist approach would resurrect and develop the competing, classical strand in the jurisprudence that first emerged in cases preventing the application of provincial game laws to native hunting on reserves. These cases suggested that Indian reserves should be regarded as "enclaves" removed from
provincial jurisdiction. For example, in R. v. Rodgers, 7 Prendergast J. stated
that
Provincial statutes, even of general application, do not, as a rule, expressly
state the territory to which they are meant to apply. They are generally worded as

if they applied to all the territory comprised within the boundaries of the Province.
236

K.M. Lysyk, "The Unique Constitutional Position of the Canadian Indian" (1967) 45 Can. Bar
Rev. 513 at 553. After undertaking a thorough survey of the pre-1951 case law, Micheline Patenaude reached a similar conclusion:
Rien ne nous permet done de penser, jusqu'4 maintenant, qu'avant 1951 les Indiens
6taient une cat6gorie particuli re de personnes qui 6chappaient Al'application du droit
provincial. I1ne faisait pas de doute, en tout cas, qu'en dehors d'une rserve indienne
un Indien devait ob6ir aux lois provinciales de la m6me fagon qu'il pouvait s'en pr6valoir (M. Patenaude, Le Droit Provincialet les Terres Indiennes (Montreal: Editions
Yvon Blais, 1986) at 96).
For other analyses of the scope of provincial jurisdiction to pass laws affecting "Indians" and
"Indian lands," see D. Sanders, "The Constitution, the Provinces and Aboriginal Peoples" in J.A.
Long & M. Boldt, eds, Governments in Conflict? Provinces and Indian Nations in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 151; L. Little Bear, "Section 88 of the Indian Act and
the Application of Provincial Laws to Indians" in Long & Boldt, eds, supra, 175; P. Hughes, "Indians and Lands Reserved for the Indians: Off-Limits to the Provinces?" (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 82; N. Lyon, "Constitutional Issues in Native Law" in Morse, ed., supra,note 239 at 408; Sanders, supra, note 229; D. Sanders, "Prior Claims: Aboriginal People in the Constitution of Canada"
in S.M. Beck & I. Bemier, eds, Canadaand the New Constitution:The Unfinished Agenda (Montreal: Institute for Research and Public Policy, 1983) 225 at 256-61; K.M. Lysyk, "Constitutional
Developments Relating to Indians and Indian Lands: An Overview," in The Constitution and the
Future of Canada,supra, note 148, 201 at 222-27; R.H. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, 2d
ed. (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, Native Law Centre, 1988).
27(1923), 33 Man. R. 139, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 414 (C.A.) [cited to D.L.R.].
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But everyone understands that they cannot apply to regions in the Province (if any)
over which the Legislature has no jurisdiction in the particular matter, and that,
however broad the terms, these regions were meant to be excepted. 238

On this interjurisdictional immunity theory, otherwise valid provincial laws
must be read down so as not to apply on Indian reserves; 9 or, in other words,
the general territorial application of provincial heads of power must be modified
when read in conjunction with federal power over Indian lands. As Perdue J.
noted in Rodgers, reading down provincial laws in this way is essential to the
preservation of essential cultural practices:
The right of an Indian to hunt or fish on his reserve without restraint or interference
is often essential to the well-being of himself and of those dependent upon
240
him.

This approach - defining a core of federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24) that is
immune from the application of provincial laws - is analogous to the use of
the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in the cases involving other heads of
federal jurisdiction that was criticized above in Part I on the grounds that, in
those contexts, the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine bears no relation to the
promotion of autonomy for the provinces (or the First Nations). We saw that the
courts have held that provincial laws must be read down if their application
would "sterilize" federally-incorporated companies or would interfere with vital
or essential elements of the operation of federal undertakings. 24' Applying this
theory to s. 91(24) means that provincial laws must be read down so as not to
apply to matters at the core of federal jurisdiction over "Indians" and "Indian
lands." While I suggested in the previous chapter that the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine unnecessarily limits provincial autonomy when applied to
other heads of federal power, its use is essential in the context of s. 91(24) in
order to promote autonomy for the First Nations.
Chief Justice Laskin developed the most expansive and compelling version
of a classical approach to the exclusivity of federal power under s. 91(24) in
several dissenting judgments in the 1970's. In Cardinalv. A.-G. Alberta,24 2 he
argued that "Indian reserves are enclaves which, so long as they exist as
Reserves, are withdrawn from provincial regulatory power." '43 He defended this
2381bid. at 423.
2 9 For other decisions applying the enclave theory to prevent the application of provincial game
laws on reserves, seeR. v. Jim, (1915), 22 B.C.R. 106,26 C.C.C. 236 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Hill, [1951]
O.W.N. 824, 101 C.C.C. 343 at 352 (Ont. S.C.) ("the Parliament of Canada is the only competent
legislative authority which can regulate the situation which is involved here"); R. v. Isaac (1975),
13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 (N.S.A.D.).
24°Supra, note 237 at 416.
241
See the cases cited in supra, note 114, and Bell 1988, supra, note 42. For a more comprehensive account of the case law, see Elliott, supra, note 45 at 523, n. 1, and Finkelstein, supra, note
127 at 525-31.
242[19741 S.C.R. 695, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 553 [hereinafter Cardinalcited to S.C.R.].
243
1bid. at 716.
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theory by pointing to the need to provide autonomy to the distinct cultural, political and economic status of reserves:
The significance of the allocation of exclusive legislative power to Parliament in
relation to Indian Reserves merits emphasis in terms of the kind of enclave that
a Reserve is. It is a social and economic community unit, with'its own political
structure as well according to the prescriptions of the Indian Act. ... The present

case concerns the regulation and administration of the resources of land comprised
in a Reserve, and I can conceive of nothing more integral to that land as such. If
the federal power given by s. 91(24) does not preclude the application of such provincial legislation to Indian Reserves, the power will have lost the exclusiveness
which is ordained by the Constitution.244
While the "enclave" theory has been heavily criticized by non-native scholars,245
it is a theory that can be supported if appropriate weight is given to the distinct
constitutional status and history of the First Nations. Indeed, the approach articulated by Professor Beetz (as he then was) to defend the autonomy of Quebec
makes good sense when applied to the First Nations:
De la m~me fagon que la collectivit6 qudb~coise est concentr~e sur un territoire,
en d'aude m~me, certains champs de l'activit6 politique lui sont-ils < r6serv6s >>;
tres termes, elle est, pour ces246domaines, considre comme devant vivre dans une
rdserve >>constitutionelle.
<<
2

41bid. at 716-8. See also Laskin C.J.'s dissenting opinion in Four B Manufacturing v. United
Garment Workers, (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031 at 1041, 102 D.L.R. (3d) 385 [hereinafter Four
B Manufacturing cited to S.C.R.] ("Where ... the issue concerns the conduct of Indians on a
reserve, provincial legislation is inapplicable unless brought in by referential federal
legislation...").
245
D. Gibson, "The 'Federal Enclave' Fallacy in Canadian Constitutional Law" (1976) 14 Alta.
L. Rev. 167; Hogg, supra, note 3 at 558 ('The [enclave] theory was always implausible, because
it involved a distinction between the first and second branches of s. 91(24) for which there is no
textual warrant, and it placed the second branch ('lands reserved for the Indians') in a privileged
position enjoyed by no other federal subject matter. It is plain that there is no constitutional distinction between 'Indians' and 'lands reserved for the Indians,' and that provincial laws may apply
to both subject matters."); Hughes, supra, note 236 at 110 (attributing the enclave theory to a
"politically-based perception that native peoples are a distinct social and political entity and
should, therefore, be accorded distinct treatment ... the enclave theorists have allowed constitutional interpretation principles to take second place to their view of the uniqueness of Indian
reserves.").
While I agree with the general criticisms that have been made of the interjurisdictional immunity
doctrine in its application to other heads of federal power, I believe these authors are wrong to suggest that federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24) should not be treated differently than any other head
of power. To suggest that it should is not simply a "politically-based perception," rather, it is one
that brings to the fore the hidden constitutional history of First Nations people, and interprets s.
91(24) with that history in mind. If this seems to be an unusual or "political" theory, I would suggest that it is only because the legitimate constitutional claims to autonomy of First Nations people
have been neglected or ignored for so long.
246
Supra, note 163 at 123.
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While autonomy for First Nations people would be furthered by interpreting federal jurisdiction over "Indian lands" as creating "constitutional reserves"
immune from provincial legislation, it is not a plausible alternative to similarly
interpret federal jurisdiction over the first branch of s. 91(24) ("Indians") as creating an "enclave" around all First Nations people that would shield them from
the application of provincial laws off reserves. Lyon has noted this difficulty:
Indians themselves move freely about the country in places and activities having
nothing to do with native culture ... Separate traffic laws for47Indians on provincial
roads, for example, would make no constitutional sense.

At the same time, subjecting First Nations people to the full operation of provincial laws off reserves in the same manner as other Canadian citizens ignores
their distinct constitutional status. The only practical alternative is to protect
First Nations people off reserves from some provincial laws, namely those that
touch matters at the core of their individual or collective identities as members
of the First Nations. Again, such a cultural understanding of a core of federal
jurisdiction over "Indians" was articulated by Laskin C.J.. In Natural Parents
v. Superintendent of Child Welfare,248 he argued that a provincial adoption law
could not constitutionally apply of its own force to the adoption of a First
Nations child by non-Indians:
It [the Adoption Act] could only embrace them if the operation of the Act did not
deal with what was integral to that head of federal legislative power, there being
no express federal legislation respecting adoption of Indians. It appears to me to
be unquestionable that for the provincial Adoption Act to apply to the adoption of
Indian children of registered Indians, who could be compelled thereunder to surrender them to adopting non-Indian parents, would be to touch "Indianness," 249
to
strike at a relationship integral to a matter outside of provincial competence.
While provincial regulatory legislation that does not touch "Indianness," such as
highway traffic legislation, could apply to native people,
Such provincial legislation is of a different class than adoption legislation which
would, if applicable as provincial legislation simpliciter,constitute a serious intrusion into the Indian family relationship. It is difficult to conceive what would be
left of exclusive federal power in relation to Indians if such provincial legislation
was held to apply to Indians. Certainly, if it was applicable because of its so-called
general application, it would be equally applicable by expressly embracing Indians. Exclusive federal authority would
then be limited to a registration system and
0
to regulation of life on a reserve.2

In subsequent cases, members of the Supreme Court have offered various
formulations of the core of federal jurisdiction over "Indians" that is immune
247

Lyon, supra, note 236 at 431.
2481[1976] 2 S.C.R. 751, 60 D.L.R. (3d) 148 [hereinafter NaturalParents cited to S.C.R.].
249
1bid. at 760-61.
2
5°Ibid. at 761.
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from the application of provincial laws: otherwise valid provincial laws must be
read down so as not to apply to Indians if their application would "impair the
status or capacity" of Indians,"' "regulate Indians qua Indians" or touch on matters that are "inherently Indian" s2 or that are "closely related to the Indian way
of life." 2 3
Unfortunately, a majority of the Supreme Court has failed to use the
"enclave" theory of "Indian lands" and a cultural understanding of the core of
federal jurisdiction over "Indians" in a manner that would enhance the autonomy of First Nations people. In Cardinal,the Supreme Court upheld the application of the Alberta Wildlife Act to convict Cardinal of selling moose on a
reserve, and in so doing rejected the enclave approach espoused by Laskin C.J.
in his dissenting opinion. According to the majority:
A provincial Legislature could not enact legislation in relation to Indians, or
in relation to Indian reserves, but this is far from saying that the effect of s. 91(24)
of the British North America Act, 1867, was to create enclaves within a Province
boundaries of which Provincial application could have no applicawithin
254the

tion.

Similarly, in FourB Manufacturing,Beetz J. for the majority upheld the application of provincial labour law on a reserve. In his view, provincial laws could
apply to Indians on or off a reserve,
so long as such laws do not single out Indians nor purport to regulate them
255qua
Indians, and as long also as they are not superseded by valid federal law.

The Supreme Court has thus rejected a broad application of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to the second branch of s. 91(24) ("Indian
lands").s In addition, the Supreme Court has given a narrow definition to the
"core of Indianness," thus severely circumscribing the role that the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine could play in relation to the first branch of s. 91(24)
("Indians"). As Lyon has stated, "[t]he dominant view in the Supreme Court ...
denies federal status to any feature of native culture." 7 As a result, in a series
251Dickson J. in Krugerv. R., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104 at 110, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 434 [hereinafter Kruger

cited to S.C.R.].
252Beetz J.in Four B. Manufacturing, supra, note 244 at 1047-48.
253
La Forest J.in Francis, supra, note 100 at 1028.
_4 Supra, note 242 at 703.

255

Supra, note 244 at 1048-49.
rThe Court has held that provincial matrimonial property legislation must be read down to preserve exclusive federal jurisdiction over the possession of lands on a reserve. Derricksonv. Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 175 (S.C.C.); Paul v. Paul, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 306, 26
D.L.R. (4th) 196 (S.C.C.) (both holding that the right to possession of lands on a reserve is of the
very essence of the federal exclusive legislative power under s. 91(24) of the ConstitutionAct,
1867, and that it follows that provincial legislation cannot apply to the right of possession of Indian
25

lands).
reserve
27

5 Supra, note 236 at 445.
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of cases, the Supreme Court has held that provincial game laws apply on
reserves 28 and off reserves," 9 provincial adoption laws apply to First Nations
children, ° provincial labour laws apply on reserves to native owned businesses,261 and provincial highway traffic laws apply on reserves.262 The Court
has held that provincial adoption law had to be read down so as not to deprive
a First Nations child of his or her federal legal status as an Indian.263 The courts
have been willing to see the legal status of an Indian created by federal government legislation as being a matter at the core of federal jurisdiction, while they
have not been willing to so characterize cultural and economic aspects of First
Nations peoples lives. In Four B Manufacturing,Beetz J. elaborated upon his
conception of matters that are "inherently Indian" in the following explanation
of why the provincial legislation at issue in that case did not touch the core of
federal jurisdiction so defined:
neither Indian status is at stake nor rights so closely connected with Indian status
that they should be regarded as necessary incidents of status such for instance as
registrability, membership in a band, the right to2articipate in the election of
Chiefs and Band Councils, reserve privileges, etc.2

It is difficult to understand why these legal attributes of Indian status, as defined
by and imposed upon First Nations people by the federal government, are central to the subject matter of "Indians" and "Indian lands," while the maintenance
of a child's
ties with his or her culture or the exercise of aboriginal rights to hunt
26 5
not.
are
In Dick v. R.,266 Lambert J.A. of the British Court of Appeal, in a dissenting
opinion, advanced the definition of the "core of Indianness" by incorporating
cultural as well as legal attributes of Indian status. He held that Dick's conviction for hunting deer out of season had to be set aside because the application
of the Wildlife Act to "hunting for food impairs the status and capacities of the
Alkali Lake Band members ...
"267 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada,

Beetz J., writing for the court, stated that he was prepared to assume, without
2 58

Cardinal,supra, note 242.

259Kruger, supra, note 251; R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 353 [hereinafter Horseman cited to S.C.R.].
26°Natural Parents,supra, note 248.
261
Four B Manufacturing, supra, note 244.
262
Francis,supra, note 100.
263
Natural Parents,supra, note 248.
264
Supra, note 244 at 1047-48.
265
See Macklem, supra,note 26 at 421: "To reduce the meaning of status and capacity to its legal
attributes leaves the provinces free to eliminate all that constitutes native difference apart from the
formal shell of legal status, so long as this process of elimination occurs through laws of general
application."
266(1982) 41 B.C.L.R. 173, 3 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (C.A.) [cited to B.C.L.R.] aff'd supra, note 59.
267
1bid. at 184.
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deciding, that Lambert J.A. was correct in concluding that the Wildlife Act had
been applied in a manner that touched the "core of Indianness":
In Cardinal... it had already been held, apart from any evidence, that provincial game laws do not relate to Indians qua Indians. In the case at bar, there was
considerable evidence capable of supporting the conclusions of Lambert J.A. to
the effect that the Wildlife Act did impair the Indianness of the Alkali Lake Band,
as well as the opposite conclusions of the courts below.
I am prepared to assume, without deciding, that Lambert J.A. was right on
this point and that appellant's submission on the first issue is well-taken ...
On the basis of this assumption and subject to the question of referential
incorporation which will be dealt with in the next chapter, it follows that the Wildlife Act could not apply to the appellant expropriovigore, and, in order to preserve
its applying
its constitutionality, it would be necessary to read
268 it down to prevent
to appellant in the circumstances of this case.
Beetz J. did not have to decide whether such a cultural understanding of the
"core of Indianness" immune from the application of provincial laws was the
correct one, since he went on to find that the Wildlife Act was rendered applicable by s. 88 of the Indian Act in any case.
S. 88 provides as follows:
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and
in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation or by-law made thereunder, and
except to the extent that those laws make provision for any matter for which provision is made by or under this Act.
There has been a great deal of judicial and academic discussion about the proper
interpretation of s. 88. The debate has centred on the interpretation of the phrase
"laws of general application" and whether Parliament's intention was to make
applicable to native people provincial laws that would otherwise not apply of
their own force because they interfered with federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24)
(the "referential incorporation" theory).269 According to a competing theory, the
"declaratory" theory, s. 88 was not intended to make provincial laws applicable
if they otherwise could not constitutionally apply to Indians because they interfered with exclusive federal jurisdiction. 70 Unfortunately, there is little indica26

8Supra, note 59 at 320-21.
0n the referential incorporation theory, provincial laws that apply generally throughout the
province, but cannot apply of their own force to First Nations people because they have an impact
on matters at the heart of native identity, are "referentially incorporated" into federal law by s. 88.
For an argument to this effect, see Lysyk, "The Unique Constitutional Position of the Canadian
Indian," supra, note 236 at 539.
27 0
0n the declaratory theory, s. 88 simply declares the pre-existing constitutional situation
regarding which provincial laws can apply to native people. In other words, provincial laws are
not ones of "general application," and thus not rendered applicable by s. 88, if they touch matters
269
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tion of Parliament's intent in the legislative history leading up the addition of
s. 88 (then s. 87) to the Indian Act in 1951. The discussion relating to s. 87 that
took place before the Joint Parliamentary Committee that studied the 1951
amendments to the Act focused on the need for protection of hunting rights and
treaty rights generally, but otherwise sheds little light on the meaning of the
phrase "provincial laNcs of general application." '
On an autonomist approach, the declaratory theory of s. 88 is to be desired.
On this approach, s. 88 has a dual purpose. First, it reversed the existing legal
situation by making treaties supreme to any conflicting provincial legislation.27
And it further advanced protection to First Nations people from the application
of provincial laws by specifying in the concluding words of s. 88 that the broadest conception of the paramountcy doctrine should be applied to render provincial laws inoperative whenever they conflicted with the IndianAct or a law passed thereunder, and whenever they dealt with a subject matter "for which
provision is made by or under" the Indian Act.2" Provincial laws of general
application, on this reading of s. 88, are simply those that would apply to "Indians" or "Indian lands" of their own force - it does not include laws that touch
matters at the heart of native identity. This interpretation of s. 88 is consistent
with an autonomist understanding of s. 91(24); that is, that the federal government has a responsibility under s. 91(24) to ensure a measure of autonomy for
the First Nations, which means, in part, securing protection from the application
of provincial laws.
It was not clear, until the Dick case, whether the declaratory, autonomist
approach or the referential incorporation approach to s. 88 would prevail. In
Kruger,Dickson J. gave support to the declaratory theory. He set out two indicia
at the heart of native identity or otherwise interfere with federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24). On
this view, the purposes of s. 88 are to give rights and powers accorded by treaty and by the Indian
Act protection from interference by provincial laws.
271
See the Minutes and Proceedings of the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Indian Act, 2d Sess., 20th Parl., 1946, vol H. p.1446ff. If anything, the legislative history leans in favour of the declaratory theory. As Little Bear argues, "[t]he debate of the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Indian Act revolved around hunting rights,
and leads one to believe that the section is a hunting reference. If this is so, then it would seem
that the section is merely declaratory of the existing law prior to 1951." Supra, note 236 at 184.
272
Prior to the enactment of s. 88 (and s. 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982), treaties were subject
to overriding provincial (and federal) legislation. R. v. White, (1965) 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481n, 52
W.W.R. 193 (S.C.C.); Sikyea v. R., [1964] S.C.R. 642, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 80; R. v. George, [1966]
S.C.R. 267, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 709.
2731n Dick, supra, note 59 at 327-28, Beetz J. questioned whether a federal legislative specification of the scope of the paramountcy rule would be effective to alter the judicially created

express conflict approach to paramountcy. I suggested above (supra,note 207) that this line of reasoning is persuasive in the context of other federal heads of power, but should not be applied to
s. 91(24) in light of the importance of a broad conception of paramountcy to First Nations
autonomy.
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for determining whether a provincial law was one of general application for the
purposes of s. 88. First, it must apply generally throughout the province. Sec-

ond, a law ceases to be one of general application when,
though in relation to another matter, by its effect, impairs the status or capacity of
a particular group. The analogy may be made to a law which in its effect paralyzes
Such an act is no "law of general
the status and274capacities of a federal company ...
application."

By stating that provincial laws that deal generally with a subject matter within
provincial jurisdiction would cease to be "laws of general application" if they
had an effect on matters at the heart of First Nations peoples collective identities, Dickson J. moved the interpretation of s. 88 in an important autonomist
direction. Notwithstanding this statement, after concluding, remarkably, that the
B.C. Wildlife Act 2" was a law of general application on this test,276 Dickson J.
was equivocal on whether proof that legislation has effects on Indian status and
capacities would in itself take legislation out of the category of "laws of general
application," or whether it had to be shown that this was the actual legislative
policy or intent:
If, of course, it can be shown in future litigation that the Province has acted in such
a way as to oppose conservation and Indian claims to the detriment of the latter
- to "preserve moose before Indians" in the words of Gordon J.A. in R. v. Strongquill - it might very well be concluded that the effect of the legislation is to cross
the line demarking laws of general application from other enactments. It would
have to be shown that the policy of such an Act was to impair the status and capacWere that so, s. 88 would not operate to make the Act applicable
ities of Indians.
277
to Indians.
While Dickson J.did not purport to resolve the debate regarding the declaratory and referential incorporation theories of s. 88,278 his definition of "laws of

general application" lent support to the former theory. According to Hogg, the
Kruger case made it clear "that the declaratory theory is correct": 279
The phrase "laws of general application" would exclude laws that singled out Indians for special treatment. As noted earlier, such laws are likely to be classified as
being in relation to Indians and therefore as invalid. Section 88 does not invigorate
such laws. The phrase "laws of general application" also excludes laws that, while
not singling out Indians for special treatment, have a specially severe effect on
Indians by impairing their status or capacity. As noted earlier, such laws cannot
80
apply to Indians of their own force. Section 88 does not make them applicable.
274

Supra, note 251 at 110, emphasis added.
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 433 [hereinafter Wildlife Act].
276
There was no evidence presented in the case on this issue.
277Supra, note 251 at 112, emphasis added.
278
1bid. at 117.
279
280Supra, note 3 at 561, n. 66.
1bid. at 560-61.
275
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However, Beetz J. rejected the declaratory, autonomist understanding of s.
88 in favour of the referential incorporation theory in the Dick case. In his view,
the intent of the legislature is determinative in deciding whether a provincial
law is one of general application. Effect is relevant only as evidence of intent.28'
Thus, even on the assumption that the application of the Wildlife Act had "the
effect of regulating [Dick] qua Indian,"
it has not been demonstrated, in my view, that this particular impact has been
intended by the provincial legislator. While it is assumed that the Wildlife Act
impairs the status or capacity of appellant, it has not been established that the legislative policy of the Wildlife Act singles out Indians for special treatment or discriminates against them in any way.
I accordingly conclude that the Wildlife Act is282a law of general application
within the meaning of the s. 88 of the Indian Act.
This result amounted to an adoption of the referential incorporation theory: even
on the assumption that the Wildlife Act could not constitutionally apply of its
own force and had to be read down to preserve the core of federal jurisdiction
over "Indians" in order to be valid, it was nevertheless rendered applicable by
its referential incorporation in federal law by s. 88.
Beetz J. then summarized the doctrinal result of his interpretation of s.
91(24) and s. 88: all valid provincial laws (i.e., those that do not single out First
Nations people and otherwise fall within provincial competence) apply to First
Nations people in the absence of conflicting treaty rights or a paramount federal
law. Valid provincial laws "which can be applied to Indians without touching
their Indianness, like traffic legislation," 3 apply of their own force, without the
assistance of s. 88. Other valid provincial laws, "which cannot apply to Indians
without regulating them qua Indians,"
are made applicable by s. 88.
In the result, while Beetz J. was open to the possibility of a cultural understanding of the "core of Indianness" that would advance the autonomy of First
Nations people, he adopted a thoroughly anti-autonomist interpretation of s. 88.
Dick's conviction for killing a deer in ancestral hunting grounds to provide food
for band members was sustained, as was the conviction in a companion case of
two members of the Coast Salish nation who were charged with killing a deer
for use in a traditional spiritual ceremony involving the burning of raw deer
meat.8 5 As Little Bear has commented:
28'Supra, note
282

59 at 323-24.
1bid. at 325-26.
2231bid. at 326.
-4Ibid.
285Jack and Charliev. R., [19851 2 S.C.R. 332,21 D.L.R. (4th) 641 [hereinafter Jack and Charlie]. The Jack and Charlieand Dick cases both concerned charges laid before the enactment of the
Constitution Act, 1982. The results in the two cases should no longer be possible in light of the
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If Indian leaders are now complaining about a lack of breathing-room under the
Indian Act, they will feel suffocated with the influx of run-of-the-mill provincial
legislation pursuant to the Dick case.
The expropriovigore interpretation in the Dick case with respect to the application of provincial law effectively eliminates the special status enjoyed by Indians under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, except for that provided
by the Indian Act, in those parts of Canada where there are no treaties. If all provincial laws that do not touch "Indianness" apply by virtue of their own force, and
if those that do are referentially incorporated via section 88, Indians who are not
covered by any treaty are legally "surrounded. 286
The referential incorporation
the delegation of exclusive federal
recalling the classical prohibition
Chief Justice Rinfret in the Nova

theory of s. 88 also amounts to a sanction of
legislative power to the provinces. It is worth
on legislative inter-delegation articulated by
Scotia Inter-delegation case:

Neither legislative bodies, federal or provincial, possess any portion of the
powers respectively vested in the other and they cannot receive it by delegation.
In that connection the word "exclusively" used in both section 91 and in section
92 indicates a settled line of demarcation and it does not belong to either Parliament, or the Legislatures, to confer powers upon the other. 7
This argument was relied upon in the Dick case to challenge the constitutional
validity of an interpretation of s. 88 that would allow for the anticipatory referential incorporation into federal law of provincial laws that would otherwise not
apply of their own force to "Indians." Beetz J. gave a one sentence response to
this argument: "In my opinion, Scott ... and Coughlin ... provide a complete
answer to this objection." 8 These cases sanctioned the devices of anticipatory
incorporation by reference and administrative inter-delegation of powers. They
did not sanction the enlargement of one level of government's powers by legislative inter-delegation. The Dick decision goes even further in undermining
the prohibition on federal inter-delegation by allowing referential incorporation
of provincial laws that are not independently valid in all of their applications.
Beetz J. interpreted s. 88 in a manner that allows provinces to determine how
matters at the "core of Indianness" will be regulated. This is a power that is
beyond the competence of the provincial legislatures for it is at the heart of federal exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians."
I argued in the last chapter that federal inter-delegation in its various forms
is a desirable device that can further provincial autonomy without compromising the principle of exclusive constitutional responsibility, so long as the condition of continuing mutual consent is fulfilled. Similarly, the federal government
Charter's guarantee of freedom of religion, and the entrenchment of "existing aboriginal and treaty
rights"
in s. 35. See Sparrow,supra, note 30.
2 6
8 Supra, note 236 at 183.
2
STSupra, note 49 at 34-35.
28SSupra, note 59 at 328.
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should be able to delegate its exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians" and "Indian
lands" to the First Nations with their continuing consent, and to the provinces,
but only with the continuing consent of the provinces and, more importantly, the
First Nations. Any other approach makes a mockery of the First Nations' claims
to autonomy and of the special relationship of the federal government to First
Nations people. 9 As the condition of mutual consent was not met prior to the
adoption of s. 88, the referential incorporation theory of s. 88 is a violation of
constitutional principles.
Another very troubling implication of the Dick case arises from Beetz J.'s
assertion that the reference to "all laws of general application" does not include
all laws of general application; rather, on his analysis, it is a reference only to
those provincial laws that would not apply of their own force to First Nations
people. In other words, the only laws referred to by s. 88 are those laws of general application that touch the "core of Indianness." If this is so, the two autonomist goals of s. 88 - the protection of treaty rights and the specification of
a broad approach to the paramountcy of the Indian Act - are undermined. If
one follows through the logic of this approach, it means that provincial laws of
general application that do not touch the "core of Indianness" will now prevail
over treaty rights (subject, of course, to s. 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982), and
they will not be subject to being rendered inoperative if they deal with matters
for which "provision is made by or under" the Indian Act as prescribed by s. 88.
Thankfully, this implication of Beetz J.'s logic appears to have been
ignored by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions regarding the interaction
of treaty rights and provincial laws. In both Sioui and Horseman, the court
assumed that treaty rights will continue to prevail over inconsistent provincial
legislation whether or not the provincial legislation touches the "core of Indianness."' z' The reasoning in Sioui ignores the defmition given by Beetz J. in Dick
2 9
8See

290

Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321; Sparrow,supra, note 30.

InHorseman, Cory J. for the majority assumed that if Horseman had acted within his treaty
rights, then he could not be charged with a violation of the Alberta Wildlife Act by virtue of s. 88.
In direct conflict with Beetz J.'s definition of a "law of general application" in Dick, Cory J.'s reasoning proceeds on the assumption that Horseman's treaty rights would prevail over any inconsistent section of the Act notwithstanding his conclusion that the Act did not affect "Indians qua Indians": "it must be recognized that the Wildlife Act is a provincial law of general application affecting
Indians not qua Indians but rather as inhabitants of the province. It follows that the Act can be
applicable to Indians pursuant to the provisions of s. 88 of the Indian Act so long as it does not
conflict with a treaty right" (supra, note 259 at 936).
Similarly, in Sioui,Lamer J. held that treaty rights prevailed over Quebec legislation without discussing whether the application of the Act affected matters at the core of native identity. Supra,
note 12 at 1065 ("Section 88 of the Indian Act is designed specifically to protect the Indians from
provincial legislation that might attempt to deprive them of rights protected by a treaty... If the
treaty gives the Hurons the right to carry on their customs and religion in the territory of JacquesCartier park, the existence of a provincial statute and subordinate legislation will not ordinarily
affect that right.").
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to the words "provincial laws of general application" in s. 88, and the reasoning

in Horseman is inconsistent with it.
The confusion is exacerbated by the decision of the court in Francis in
which Beetz J.'s approach to the meaning of "provincial laws of general application" in s. 88 was affirmed. The issue in Franciswas whether the appellant
could be convicted for a violation of the New Brunswick Motor Vehicle Act 29'
that occurred on a reserve. The appellant argued that the charge was defective,
as he could only be convicted under the Indian Reserve Traffic Regulations...
(which simply incorporated and made applicable provincial highway traffic
laws in force in a province). La Forest J., writing for the court, held that the provincial highway traffic law could apply of its own force on reserves:
I shall begin by saying that, in the absence of conflicting federal legislation,
provincial motor vehicle laws of general application apply ex proprio vigore on
Indian reserves. To hold otherwise would amount to resuscitating the "enclave"
theory which was rejected by a majority of this court in Cardinal... In Kruger ...

this court held that general provincial legislation relating to hunting applies on
reserves, a matter which is obviously far more closely related to the Indian way
of life than driving motor vehicles. Indeed, Beetz J., speaking for the court in Dick
traffic legislation applies to Indians without
... expressly stated that provincial
2 93
touching their Indianness.
In this way, the court continued to reject the relevance of the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine when applied to Indian reserves, and blithely found another
aspect of Indian life on reserves subject to the double aspect doctrine and the
concurrent operation of federal and provincial law it entails.294
29 1

R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-17 [hereinafter Motor Vehicle Act].
C.R.C. 1978, c. 959 [hereinafter Indian Reserve Traffic Regulations].
293
Supra, note 100 at 1028-29.
294
For an excellent discussion of the Franciscase, see D. Pothier, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1987-88 Term" (1989) 11 Sup. Ct L. Rev. 41 at 107-110. As she points out, the
contrast between Francisand the decision in Bell 1988 could not be more pronounced (ironically,
Bell 1988 was decided the same day). In Francis,the court refused to invoke the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine to protect federal jurisdiction over Indian lands, while in Bell 1988 it gave it
a large definition to protect the core of federal jurisdiction over federal undertakings. And while
Beetz J. cautioned against the casual application of the double aspect doctrine in Bell 1988, the
court found no need in Francisto discuss whether there was a "real and not merely nominal" double aspect to the regulation of highway traffic on reserves. These two cases provide poignant evidence of the degree to which non-constitutional values are influencing the use of interpretive
doctrines.
From the point of view of promoting autonomy for the provinces and the First Nations, the use
made of the interjurisdictional immunity in Bell 1988 and Francisought to have been reversed:
as I argued in Part III, reading down provincial statutes to protect exclusive federal jurisdiction
over federal undertakings does not promote the autonomy of the provinces; while employing the
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to prevent provincial laws from applying on Indian reserves
has everything to do with the promotion of autonomy for First Nations people.
292
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Nevertheless, the argument remained, based on the paramountcy doctrine,
that the provincial highway traffic laws were rendered inoperative on Indian
reserves by virtue of the federal regulations "covering the field." Indeed, s. 88
of the IndianAct states that provincial laws of general application will not apply
to Indians if those provincial laws "make provision for any matter for which
provision is made by or under" the Indian Act. Since the Indian Reserve Traffic
Regulations made provision for the matter of highway traffic on reserves, the
New Brunswick Motor Vehicle Act could have no application to Francis or any
other native person.
However, this argument was precluded by the logic of Beetz J.'s interpretation of the meaning of "provincial laws of general application" in the Dick
case. In Francis,La Forest J.noted that counsel on all sides of the dispute had
"rightly conceded" that s. 88 "had no direct bearing on this case":
In Dick v. The Queen ...
this court held that s. 88 served to incorporate only those
provincial laws that did not extend to Indians ex proprio vigore. In particular,
Beetz J. expressly referred to traffic regulations as laws that applied to Indian
reserves ex proprio vigore and as such not falling within the types of provincial
laws extended to Indians by s. 88.295

On this reasoning, First Nations people will not benefit from the autonomist
purposes of s. 88 insofar as provincial laws of general application that do not
touch the "core of Indianness" are concerned. Such laws will not be subordinate
to treaty rights pursuant to s. 88, nor will they be inapplicable by virtue of s. 88
to the extent that they deal with matters covered by the Indian Act.
S.88 aside, there was nothing to prevent the court from invoking the paramountcy doctrine in this situation of overlapping, duplicative laws in order to
render the provincial law inoperative. A classical, "covering the field,"
approach to paramountcy would best promote the autonomy of the First Nations

by rendering inoperative any provincial law dealing with a matter covered in
federal legislation. Instead, La Forest J. applied the modem, "express conflict"
conception of paramountcy:
The mere fact that the federal government has adopted the provincial traffic
laws does not, in my view, display a sufficient intent that it wished to cover the
field exclusively. As Professor Laskin ...
observed ... "It may be the better part of

wisdom to require the federal Parliament to speak clearly
' 296 if it seeks, as it constitutionally can demand, paramountcy for its policies.
295

Supra, note 100 at 1030-31.
1bid. at 1031. I have suggested in the discussion of Hall (supra, notes 201-208 and accompanying text) that, rather than applying a classically broad approach to the paramountcy of federal
legislation passed under heads of powers other than s. 91(24), La Forest J. should have found the
modem approach to paramountcy to be the better part of wisdom. On my analysis, La Forest J.
is quite content to invoke differing conceptions of paramountcy, but I am suggesting that their use
in Hall and Francis ought to have been reversed.
296
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Parliament appeared to have spoken clearly when it demanded in s. 88 that a
broad approach to paramountcy be applied to protect First Nations people from
the application of provincial laws - provincial laws of general application cannot apply to Indians "to the extent that such laws make provision for any matter
for which provision is made by or under the [Indian] Act."
La Forest J.'s analysis in Francis, coupled with Beetz J.'s approach in
Dick, leads to the following conclusions regarding paramountcy: a provincial
law of general application that does not touch the "core of Indianness" will be
subject to the modem, express conflict test; a provincial law of general application that touches the "core of Indianness" will be made applicable to Indians
by s. 88 and also subject to the broad paramountcy of matters dealt with by the
IndianAct prescribed by that section. On this analysis, if the courts do not move
beyond a strictly legal "status and capacities" conception of the "core of Indianness," s. 88's autonomist approach to paramountcy is superfluous. For provincial laws that interfere with the legal rights inherent in Indian status under the
Indian Act will likely run afoul of the modem express conflict approach to paramountcy in any case.
In sum, the Supreme Court has interpreted s. 91(24) of the Constitution
1982
and s. 88 of the Indian Act in a manner that frustrates the possibilities
Act,
inherent in those sections to promote autonomy for First Nations people.297
While the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, a broad approach to federal
paramountcy, and a prohibition on federal inter-delegation absent the consent of
the First Nations would all contribute to creating space in -which First Nations
governments could be guaranteed meaningful autonomy, these doctrines have
been rejected in the context of s. 91(24). Similarly, the courts have rejected the
declaratory theory of s. 88 which could have been employed to promote autonomy for the First Nations by reading the phrase "provincial laws of general
application" as not including laws that have the effect of touching matters at the
heart of native identity, and ensuring that all other provincial laws are subordinated to treaty rights and are suspended if they deal with matters dealt with by
or under the IndianAct. Instead, the courts have made it possible for non-native
governments to "legally surround" First Nations people by adopting the referential incorporation theory of s. 88, and by adopting a definition of "provincial
laws of general application" that has the potential to undermine the autonomist
purposes of s. 88. These results are all the more disappointing in light of the fact
that the available doctrines - such as the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine
297

pothier, supra, note 294, reaches a similar conclusion: "The narrow approach to section
91(24) in Francis and earlier cases shows no hint of enabling section 91(24) to be used as such
a springboard for the development of aboriginal self-government. The Court seems to be completely untouched by the fact that aboriginal self-government has been prominent on the constitutional agenda in the past few years" (supra at 109).
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- have been employed liberally in other constitutional contexts in which their
use cannot be defended in terms of democratic and federal principles.
In the last section, we saw that the classical paradigm is frequently advocated as the best means of promoting provincial autonomy. In contrast, I argued
that both the modem paradigm (by extending the scope of application of provincial laws and by permitting the use of federal inter-delegation) and the classical
paradigm (by confining the degree to which federal legislation is permitted to
overlap with provincial heads of power) have a role to play in promoting provincial autonomy. In this section, we have seen that various aspects of the modem paradigm have been applied to the interpretation of federal jurisdiction over
"Indians and lands reserved for the Indians"; as a result, First Nations people are
subject to large areas of concurrent federal and provincial jurisdiction. The doctrinal techniques of the classical paradigm have a large role to play if autonomy
for First Nations people is to be given its properly central place in the interpretation of the Canadian constitution.
Conclusion
An analysis of the case law interpreting the constitutional division of powers indicates that the doctrinal techniques of what I have called the classical and
modem paradigms have been utilized by the courts at all stages of our constitutional history. Most scholars have associated the use of these paradigms with
particular time periods and courts - the classical paradigm is frequently associated with the pre-World War II Privy Council era, and the modem paradigm
with the Supreme Court of Canada's post-war jurisprudence. I have suggested
that it is more fruitful to map the use of the two paradigms by reference to differing judicial attitudes to regulation in different areas of social life. The deregulatory bias of the classical paradigm has been applied to legislation that is
viewed as interfering with the operation of free markets; the judicial tolerance
of the modem paradigm has been applied to legislation perceived to deal with
issues of morality or social order, and have been used to override the special
constitutional status of First Nations. These broad tendencies in the doctrinal
structure of Canadian federalism can be traced from the early days following
Confederation through to the present day.
Most Canadian scholars have been partisans of either the classical or the
modem paradigm as the only appropriate approach to defining the meaning of
exclusivity in the division of powers. The classical paradigm has been defended
by jurists such as Jean Beetz as the best means of preserving an authentic federalism with equally autonomous provincial and federal governments. Others,
such as Peter Hogg, have defended the judicial restraint inherent in the modem
paradigm as the appropriate interpretive posture of an unaccountable judiciary.
I have argued that the task of federal interpretation should not be approached as
an either/or choice between the two paradigms. Both the classical and modem
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paradigms are legitimate attempts to give real meaning to exclusivity and to the
democratic principle of exhaustiveness. Each has an important role to play in
promoting autonomy for the provinces and the First Nations.
Our constitutional jurisprudence is characterized by a remarkable unwillingness to recognize that there exist competing approaches to the interpretation
of the division of powers. I suspect that this reticence flows in part from a reluctance to acknowledge that their use has indeed been inconsistent or "political."
However, it is not an apolitical or principled position to advocate that the modem or the classical approach to exclusivity be adopted uniformly as the preferred method of interpretation of the constitutional division of powers. Such an
approach does not do justice to the distinct constitutional status of the First
Nations, nor to the differing constitutional positions, flowing from the rule of
federal paramountcy, of the provincial and federal governments in terms of their
ability to preserve their respective autonomies. I have argued that respect for the
First Nations distinct constitutional status requires that the classical approach to
exclusivity be applied to the interpretation of federal jurisdiction over "Indians"
and "Indian lands." And I have argued that a recognition of the potential for federal dominance inherent in the federal paramountcy rule requires that the latter
rule be given a narrow scope, and that a corresponding asymmetry be adopted
in the interpretation of the scope of federal and provincial powers. Provincial
heads of power should be "more exclusive" than federal heads of power other
than s. 91(24), for the provinces, in contrast to the federal government's position
vis-a-vis provincial legislation, lack the power to protect themselves from overlapping federal legislation.
It would be a mistake to believe that redirecting the manner in which the
interpretive principles of Canadian federalism have been employed would in
itself overcome the apparently growing divide between the "three solitudes" of
the Canadian constitution. Neither Quebec nor the First Nations believe that
they are full and equal partners in the Canadian Confederation, and both are
seeking a fundamental restructuring of constitutional arrangements. Sweeping
constitutional change appears inevitable, while at the same time, if past experience is any guide, it may be some time before the details are put in place.
Thus, there is some value in challenging the tendency in the current constitutional climate to make the mistaken assumption that all existing possibilities for constitutional accommodation have been exhausted. I have tried to show
in this paper, that until the time that constitutional amendments are made, there
is significant unexplored potential within the existing framework of Canadian
constitutional law for promoting the autonomy of the provinces and the First
Nations.

